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ARTICLES
THE DEATH PENALTY IN FLORIDA
©CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
INTRODUCTION
Florida is one of thirty-five states in the United States that executes
its citizens.' Since 1972, when Florida's legislature reinstated the death
penalty2 (less than six months after the United States Supreme Court
declared the capital punishment system as then administered unconsti-
tutional3 ), the state has averaged over thirty-eight death sentences a
year and executed sixty-seven individuals. 4 Close to four hundred peo-
ple are currently imprisoned on Florida's death row (12% of the na-
tion's total). 5 These numbers make Florida the second most active
death sentencing state, after Texas. 6
Florida leads the country in one other death penalty-related cate-
gory: At least twenty-two people have been released from Florida's
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Through
July, 2008, the author was the Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of
Florida Levin College of Law.
1 See Facts about the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter DPIC Facts] (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
2 1972 FLA. LAws 16-17, 20, (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, defining murder;
775.082, defining penalties; 921.141, defining sentencing procedures).
3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4 DPIC Facts, supra note 1, at 3.
5 Id. at 2 (indicating 397 people on Florida's death row, out of 3309 nationwide).
6 Id. at 2-3. Virginia (103) and Oklahoma (eighty-nine) have executed more individ-
uals than Florida in the modern era, but have many fewer people on death row (Vir-
ginia has twenty-one, Oklahoma eighty-four). Id.
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death row, nineteen of whom were sentenced after 1972.7 The next
state in line is Illinois, with eighteen exonerations, and the third state,
Texas, is far behind, at nine.8
Thus, it was not surprising that the American Bar Association
picked Florida as one of the eight death penalty states to be the focus
of its Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project. That Project
was created in 2001, in the wake of the ABA's 1997 call for a nation-
wide moratorium on executions.9 The objective of the moratorium was
to allow states time to identify and eliminate flaws in the death penalty
process. 10 In aid of that goal, the ABA established the Project to collect
data about the death penalty and encourage government leaders to
undertake a detailed examination of capital punishment and enact any
needed reforms.11 The Project set up Assessment Teams in Florida and
seven other states, with instructions to investigate twelve aspects of
death penalty administration: police investigation procedures; the use
of DNA evidence; crime laboratories and medical examiners;
prosecutorial discretion; defense services; jury instructions; the judicial
role; the direct appeal process; state post-conviction and federal
habeas proceedings; clemency proceedings; the treatment of racial
and ethnic minorities; and the treatment of people with mental illness
and mental retardation.1 2
I was asked to be chair of the Florida Assessment Team. The rest
of the Team consisted of an ex-Florida Supreme Court justice, a trial
court judge, one of the leading prosecutors in the state, a retired pub-
lic defender who litigated trials and appeals, a specialist in post-convic-
7 FLA. COMM'N ON CAPITAL CASES, CASE HISTORIES, A REVIEW OF 23 INDIDUALS RE-
LEASED FROM DEATH Row (June 20, 2002), available at http://www.floridacapitalcases.
state.fl.us/Publications/Deathrow.pdf (listing twenty-three exonerees, one of whom,
Frank Lee Smith, was cleared posthumously).
8 DPIC Facts, supra note 1, at 2.
9 Ai. BAR AS'N SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES ET AL., ABA REc-
OMMENDATION No. 107 (Feb. 3, 1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/rec107.
html.
10 See id.
1i LESLIE A. HARRIS, AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA REPORT ACCOMPANYING RECOMMENDATION
No. 107, at 2 (Feb. 3, 1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/irr/rpt107.
wpd ("[I]t should now be apparent to all of us in the profession that the administration
of the death penalty has become so seriously flawed that capital punishment should not
be implemented without adherence to the various applicable ABA policies.").
12 See A.B.A, A.B.A. Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, Individual State As-
sessments, http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/home.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2009).
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tion appeals, a former special counsel to Florida governors on the
criminal justice system and clemency in particular, and a social scien-
tist.'3 Also attending one or more Team meetings were the President
of the Florida Bar (a defense attorney), a State Senator (a former pros-
ecutor), and a second trial court judge, as well as eight University of
Florida Levin College of Law students, who helped gather and analyze
information.
In this article, I will sketch out our findings in all twelve areas
noted above, along with the recommendations the Assessment Team
made with respect to each, all of which were endorsed unanimously by
the eight Team members. 14 The three most significant concerns about
the Florida death penalty process that evolved out of our research were
the following: (1) mechanisms for assuring the quality and adequate
compensation of counsel in capital cases are lacking; (2) the combina-
tion of poor jury instructions, Florida's unique practice of allowing the
jury to recommend a sentence of death by a majority vote, and the fact
that judges are elected (and thus arguably subject to popular pressure
to impose the death penalty) undermines the legitimacy of death
sentences that are imposed; and (3) the geographical and racial dis-
parities associated with capital charging and death sentences call into
question the fairness of the death penalty system. 5 The Team made
recommendations in each of these areas. It also made recommenda-
tions concerning the clemency decision-making process and treatment
of people with mental disabilities. 16 This article adds to these propos-
als several reform suggestions designed to deal with matters that the
Team examined but did not make recommendations about: deficien-
13 In the order referenced in the text, these individuals were: ex-Justice Leander J.
Shaw, Jr.; Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr. (18th Judicial Circuit); Harry L. Shorstein (Jacksonville
state attorney); Michael Minerva (former public defender in the SecondJudicial Circuit
and Director of the Office of Capital Collateral Representative); Sylvia H. Walbolt (Carl-
ton Fields law firm); Mark Schlakman (former special counsel to Governor Lawton
Chiles and transition advisor to GovernorJeb Bush); Mark Fondacaro (Ph.D. psycholo-
gist at the University of Florida).
14 AM. BAR Ass'N., EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYS-
TEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT-AN ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA'S
DEATH PENALTY LAWS, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.
abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/report.pdf [hereinafter FLORIDA
REPORT]. The Florida Report was based on a report by the Assessment Team, entitled
PRELIMINARY REPORT: FLORIDA ASSESSMENT TEAM (July 1, 2005) (on file with author)
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT].
15 
FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at iv-ix.
16 Id. at xi-xii.
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cies in police investigation techniques, under-monitored crime labs,
and attorney misconduct and nonfeasance.
All of the problems discussed in this article contribute to convic-
tion of innocent people and to death sentences for people who are
guilty but not deserving of the ultimate penalty. Thus, in addition to
reforms in the specific areas identified above, the Assessment Team
recommended the establishment of an independent commission
scheme designed to investigate and evaluate claims of innocence. 17
This recommendation, discussed in the conclusion to this article, is
meant to address deficiencies in all twelve areas to the extent they un-
dermine the reliability of the legal process. A more subtle problem
noted by the Assessment Team, also discussed in the conclusion, is the
huge investment in financial and human resources required by the ad-
ministration of the death penalty, to the probable detriment of the rest
of the criminal justice system.18
The discussion below is inevitably selective. The subjects empha-
sized here are not necessarily the findings that other members of the
Assessment Team would have stressed. Further, the characterizations
and analysis of the case law, statutes, procedures, and practices are
mine alone; they should not to be attributed to any other member of
the Team.
Police Investigation Procedures
The police can heavily influence death penalty cases in a number
of ways. Perhaps most importantly, the manner in which they conduct
interrogations and identification procedures can seriously taint the en-
tire prosecution if certain procedures are not followed.1 9 If police vio-
late constitutional rights during the investigative stages, they may
prevent conviction of a person who is clearly guilty, because the courts
may feel compelled to exclude illegally obtained confessions or identi-
fications even though they are reliable.20 Of at least equal concern is
the possibility that conduct that courts do not consider unconstitu-
17 Id. at ix-x.
18 Id. at xii.
19 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, passim (1998).
20 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (requiring exclusion of con-
fessions obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
302 (1967) (requiring exclusion of identifications obtained in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, but holding there was no such violation).
[Vol. 1: 17
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tional, or violations of the Constitution that are not discovered by the
courts, will produce evidence that is unreliable and lead to the convic-
tion of an innocent person.
With respect to interrogations, the most important issue is
whether police techniques are so coercive that they might cajole a per-
son into confessing to a crime he or she did not commit. Florida
courts have excluded confessions that appear to have been involuntary
under the totality of the circumstances. 21 But in several cases involving
capital charges, the Florida judiciary has refused to exclude confes-
sions made under conditions that empirical research suggests can be
conducive to false statements.
For instance, one of the primary precipitants of such confessions
is a lengthy interrogation during which the police convince the suspect
that making incriminating statements is the only way to escape an in-
tolerably stressful situation. 22 Yet in Chavez v. State,23 a capital case, the
Florida Supreme Court held that an interrogation that took place over
a fifty-four-hour period was not unconstitutional because the defen-
dant was provided with food, drink and cigarettes "at appropriate
times," permitted to have one six-hour rest period, and was repeatedly
advised of his Miranda rights. In another capital case, Nelson v. State,24
the Court stated that, although the suspect was interrogated from late
one night to 8:30 the next morning and then from 9 p.m. that day "for
the majority of the night," his confession was voluntary because he had
three breaks during the latter period, was offered cold drinks and cof-
fee, and was permitted to use the restroom. 25
21 See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278, 290-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
confession involuntary because it was the product of enforced sleeplessness resulting
from a sixteen-hour serial interrogation, during which the defendant was provided with
no meaningful breaks and police asked him misleading questions, denied his requests
to rest, refused to honor his Miranda rights, and used the defendant's history of black-
outs to undermine his reliance on his own memory).
22 See Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 979, 1021
(2003) ("In fifteen of the sixteen proven or probable false confession cases in which
Leo and Ofshe specify the length of the interrogation, the police interrogated the sus-
pect for more than six hours."); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of
Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. ScI. PUB. INT. 33, 54 (2004)
(describing a 2004 study that found that the average length of interrogation leading to
false confessions was 16.3 hours).
23 Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 749 (Fla. 2002).
24 Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 524 (Fla. 2003).
25 See also Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 311 (Fla. 1997) (describing a 6 hour inter-
rogation in which the suspect was allowed to use the restroom and was given drinks);
Roberts v. State, 164 So. 2d 817, 819-20 (Fla. 1964) (holding confession admissible even
2009]
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A second technique that research suggests is particularly likely to
produce a false confession is a police pronouncement that the suspect
will suffer a significant penalty unless a confession is forthcoming.2 6
Yet in one capital case the Florida Supreme Court refused to find in-
voluntary a confession from a defendant who not only was repeatedly
told he was guilty but was threatened with the "electric chair" before
being promised that a confession would help him out.27 Similarly, in
another capital case the court held that the interrogators' intimation
that the suspect would be in a worse position legally if he did not admit
his involvement in the murder did not invalidate his confession. 2
Research also indicates that people who have mental retardation
are especially likely to confess falsely because of their tendency to ac-
quiesce to authority figures even when the resulting statements are in-
accurate and detrimental to their interests. 29 To the state's credit,
Florida police do receive training about how to communicate Miranda
warnings to people suspected of being mentally retarded. Training
regarding the suggestibility and gullibility of people with retardation,
however, is minimal. Furthermore, many Florida decisions do not
evince sensitivity about this issue. For example, in one first degree
murder case involving a defendant who possessed the verbal skills and
sophistication of a nine year-old, the appellate court affirmed the vol-
untariness of his waiver of counsel based on an equivocal statement ("I
ain't concerned about a lawyer. I'm concerned about my life.") and a
though suspect was interrogated intermittently from 6:30 p.m. until 1:30 a.m., and then
from 9:30 a.m. the next day until he confessed at around 12 p.m.).
26 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 916-17 (2004) (distinguishing "low-end" from "high-end"
inducements, and stating that "[huigh-end inducements either implicitly or explicitly com-
municate the message that the suspect will receive less punishment, a lower prison sen-
tence, or some form of investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, or juror leniency or
clemency if he confesses, but that the suspect will receive a higher charge or longer
prison sentence if he does not confess.") (emphasis in original).
27 Walker, 707 So. 2d at 311.
28 Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 472 (Fla. 2003).
29 See Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing the Capacity of Persons with
Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAw & PSYCHOL.
REv. 53, 56-58 (2004) (noting that people with retardation have "a strong desire to
please others, especially those in authority"). Many of the known false confessions
come from people with mental retardation. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 26, at 971
(finding "at least twenty-eight" cases involving mentally retarded defendants).
30 FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COM-
MISSION, LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC RECRUIT CURRICULUM VOLUME 1, at 157, available at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/ble94dd5-d9f2-49cf-b753-903fa3dlb472/
FLBRCV-pdf.aspx.
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"written waiver" that apparently consisted of the defendant circling
statements on a form at the direction of the officer. 1
The confessions in these particular cases may have been accurate.
But many confessions obtained by Florida police, using techniques sim-
ilar to those just described, 2 have not been. Richard Leo and Richard
Ofshe, the preeminent researchers in this area, describe three false
confession cases out of Florida.33 Donald Shoup, a mentally retarded
teenager charged with capital murder and robbery in Daytona Beach,
confessed to the crime but was released after another person admitted
he was responsible. 4 A second questionable confession came from
Martin Salazar, whose murder charges were dismissed when it was dis-
covered that the prosecutor and police withheld exculpatory finger-
print evidence. 5 In the third case, Tom Sawyer confessed to rape and
murder, but the judge suppressed his confession because no evidence
linked him to the crimes, his narrative fit poorly with the facts, and he
could not produce any statements specific to the crime scene. 6
Three other cases are described by other sources. In the first, in-
vestigators from Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, and the Broward Sheriff's Of-
fice obtained a confession from a man who was later exonerated with
DNA evidence. 7 In the second, Peter Dallas confessed to murder and
implicated two friends after being threatened with the electric chair by
31 Lewis v. State, 747 So. 2d 995, 996-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). See also Bevel v.
State, 983 So. 2d 505, 515-16 (Fla. 2008); Benitez v. State, 952 So. 2d 1275, 1278-79 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (remanding case, rather than suppressing confession of person
with mental retardation).
32 See Paula McMahon & Ardy Friedberg, Behan Case Prosecutors in a Bind; Charge Un-
likely for 2nd Suspect, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 16, 2003, at lB (quoting an attorney who
observed that exonerations that had recently occurred in Broward County had a "pat-
tern" to them: "Mentally ill or mentally retarded people, often black men, are convicted
on the strength of alleged confessions obtained by detectives who.., are poorly trained
and poorly supervised."); Daniel de Vise, Suspects' False Confessions Ignite Interrogation De-
bate, MIAMI HERALD, June 14, 2001, at Al (alleging that police have regularly created
false evidence, exaggerated the strength of the case, and led suspects to believe their
fate is sealed, and that as a result people occasionally confess to a crime they did not
commit).
33 Richard A. Leo & RichardJ. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in an Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY. 429, 452, 454, 457-58 (1998).
34 See id. at 452.
35 See id. at 454.
36 See id. at 457-58.
37 Michael McGuire, Taped Police Interrogations Gain Momentum in Florida, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 8, 2003, at Cl.
2009]
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Broward County police. Two other men were later convicted of the
murder.38 Finally, the murder conviction of Timothy Brown, a mentally
retarded teenager, was reversed after a federal judge deemed his con-
fession inadmissible because of threats from his interrogators.3 9
All of these cases involved capital charges. In most of them suspi-
cions about the accuracy of the confession surfaced prior to trial and
conviction. But the fact remains that the police relied on methods that
produced a provably false or highly suspect confession. The police in
these cases probably believed that the techniques they used were not
likely to produce flawed results. Those beliefs need to change, and
arguably Florida courts need to do more to change them.
A separate problem is the difficulty of finding out if police have
used techniques that courts identify as impermissible. One method of
dealing with this problem, recommended by commentators on all
points of the political spectrum, is to videotape interrogations. 4 A few
states have mandated taping,41 but no Florida court has done so. Some
Florida police departments require taping of interrogations in homi-
cide cases,42 but they usually do not mandate that the entire interroga-
tion be taped. 43  One large department even prohibits the latter
38 Tonya Alanez, Case Costs County $2.7 Million, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 16, 2007, at
lB.
39 Wanda DeMarzo, Interrogation-Videotaping Bill Advances, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10,
2004, at 5B. Editorial, Interrogations on Tape, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, March 13, 2004, at
18A. Paula McMahon, Hidden Cameras Earn Rave Reviews in Interrogations, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2003, at lB. SeealsoKeatonv. State, 273 So. 2d 385, 386-87 (Fla. 1973)
(noting state obtained confessions from Keaton and his co-defendant that they commit-
ted murders for which three other individuals were eventually convicted); Wanda J.
DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, Ft. Lauderdale to Videotape all Homicide Interrogations, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 1, 2003, at 1A (noting that the adoption of a taping rule in Ft. Lauderdale
came in the wake of a series of newspaper articles detailing thirty-eight murder confes-
sions that were "rejected by Broward authorities as false or tainted in the past decade.").
40 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 387, 489-92 (1996); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safe-
guards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 153-55 (1997).
41 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d
587, 592 (Minn. 1994); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34
(Mass. 2004) (holding a cautionaryjury instruction required if confession is not taped).
42 As of 2006, twenty-three Florida law enforcement agencies regularly tape a majority
of custodial interrogations. Thomas P. Sullivan, The Time Has Come for Law Enforcement
Recordings of Custodial Interviews, Start to Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 175 app. at
183 (2006).
43 Id.
[Vol. 1: 17
HeinOnline  -- 1 Elon L. Rev. 24 2009
The Death Penalty in Florida
practice, instead only permitting taping of "a summary/recap" of the
interview.44
In interesting contrast to these relatively relaxed rules for interro-
gations in capital (and noncapital) cases are the very restrictive rules
that apply to interrogation of the police themselves when they are sus-
pected of an infraction or crime. Florida law states that in interroga-
tions of law enforcement and corrections officers, officers may not use
offensive language or threaten transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary ac-
tion. Further, interrogations must be limited to "reasonable periods"
and "allow for such personal necessities and rest periods as are reason-
ably necessary," may not involve more than one interrogator, and must
be taped in their entirety.4 Apparently the police understand the ways
in which interrogation can be coercive or produce misleading state-
ments, and have lobbied to minimize those possibilities as much as
possible when they are the focus of an investigation.
These revelations about interrogation law and practice in Florida
should, by themselves, trigger significant concern about police investi-
gation in death penalty cases. Even more troublesome, however, is
Florida practice in connection with eyewitness identification, which is
by far the most common cause of erroneous convictions.46 To a jury,
nothing is more persuasive than a witness who takes the stand and,
under oath, points to the defendant saying, "That's the one." Yet mis-
identifications are, unfortunately, quite common. At least five of Flor-
ida's death row exonerees were convicted in part on the basis of faulty
eyewitness testimony.4 7
44 OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, OPERATIONAL ORDER 18.1.12.VIII
(cited in ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 14, at 79) (on file with author).
45 FLA. STAT. § 112.532(l) (e)-(g) (2008).
46 Wells et al., supra note 19, at 605 (estimating that eyewitness identifications are
responsible for roughly 90% of convictions reversed through DNA testing). Of the
eighty-six wrongful capital convictions studied by the Death Penalty Information
Center, eyewitness identifications were by far the most prevalent cause. Rob Warden,
How Mistaken and Perjured Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on
Death Row, May 2001, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/StudyCWC2001.pdf. Another
study found that 48.8% of 205 cases involving erroneous convictions resulting from
misidentifications. Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Crim-
ina Justice System, 12 L. & HUM BEHAV. 283, 291 (1988).
47 Joseph Green's conviction was overturned in 1996 because the testimony of the
state's key eyewitness was often inconsistent and contradictory. Green v. Florida, 688 So.
2d. 301, 307 (1996). Frank Lee Smith's conviction was overturned based on DNA evi-
dence; the chief eyewitness recanted her testimony. Sydney P. Freedberg, He Didn't Do
It, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 7, 2001, at IA. Freddie Pitts was pardoned in 1975 in part
because the one eyewitness against him recanted her accusations. FLA. TIMES-UNION,
2009]
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Sometimes witnesses simply get it wrong all on their own, due to
perception or memory problems. But on other occasions the police,
perhaps unwittingly, help create inaccuracy by relying on identification
procedures that are highly suggestive and likely to produce unreliable
results. Research indicates that a host of police practices significantly
increase the potential for misidentifications. These include: one-on-
one confrontations; lineups in which the "distractors" look like the sus-
pect rather than the witness' pre-lineup description of the perpetrator;
police suggestions or knowledge that the perpetrator is in the lineup;
and failure to keep multiple eyewitnesses separate during the proce-
dure.48 Particularly troubling is laboratory research indicating that
roughly 60% of eyewitnesses will say the perpetrator is present in line-
ups in which the researchers know the perpetrator is absent.49 This
finding has significant implications for real world identifications,
where either police or self-induced pressure makes eyewitnesses partic-
ularly eager to help solve a case and look competent.
All of these problems can be easily avoided. For instance, when-
ever possible, police can use lineups or photo arrays instead of con-
frontations, avoid suggesting that a particular person in the lineup or
array is a suspect, and always emphasize that the perpetrator may not
be in the lineup or array. Numerous organizations have developed
checklists that can aid police departments in carrying out reliability-
enhancing identification procedures. 0
April 23, 1998; Sydney P. Freedberg, The 13 Other Survivors and Their Stories., ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, July 4, 1999, at 10A. The capital charges against Delbert Tibbs were dis-
missed, in part because the testimony of the female victim was uncorroborated and
inconsistent with her first description of her assailant. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788,
791 (Fla. 1976) (relying in part on dubious nature of eyewitness testimony in granting
new trial); Bradley Scott was released by the Florida Supreme Court in 1991 in part
because the testimony of eyewitnesses was plagued with inconsistencies. Scott v. State,
581 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1991). See also Ramos v. State, 496 So. 2d. 121, 123 (Fla. 1986)
(finding dog scent lineup unfair because defendant was interrogated in room in which
the lineup was conducted and the shirt and knife identified were the only such items in
lineup with blood on them).
48 See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and
Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765 (1995).
49 Ralph N. Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057, 1080 (2000).
50 See Wells et al., supra note 19, at 610-12; How Fair is Your Lineup?, 2 Soc. ACTION IN
LAw 9-10 (1975).
[Vol. 1: 17
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But Florida practice does not always adhere to these types of
guidelines and, in contrast to some states,51 neither the courts nor the
legislature in Florida has produced any specific rules governing identi-
fication procedures. Instead, Florida courts follow the U.S. Supreme
Court's lead,52 and thus admit identifications taken under unnecessa-
rily suggestive circumstances such as confrontations or one-picture
photo arrays as long as there are other "indicia of reliability," which
can consist solely of a witness' declaration that he or she is basing a
subsequent, non-suggested identification on a memory "independent"
of the tainted identification.53 Unfortunately, memories are not so eas-
ily compartmentalized; our current "recollections" of a given incident
are often heavily (and unconsciously) influenced by intervening
events, such as a suggestive identification procedure.5 4
Many individual Florida police departments have developed iden-
tification procedure rules, but they are deficient in various ways. For
51 See, e.g., Office of the Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Attorney General Guide-
lines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (April 18,
2001), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NJ-eyewitness.pdf.
52 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226
n.2 (1977) (indicating that the factors to consider in determining whether an identifi-
cation has an "independent basis" from a tainted identification include the prior op-
portunity to observe the alleged criminal act, any identification of another person prior
to lineup, failure to identify defendant on a prior occasion, and lapse of time between
the alleged act and the lineup identification).
53 Thus, for example, a number of Florida cases have held that one-on-one show-ups,
although inherently suggestive, were necessary or were not likely to produce unreliable
identifications or both, given the circumstances. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d
495, 518 (Fla. 2005) (holding that although showing a single photograph of defendant
to witness prior to showing witness photographic array was unduly suggestive, witness's
independent recollection of defendant at time of murder offense provided basis for his
identification); State v. Hernandez, 841 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (hold-
ing a show-up identification admissible because of witness' opportunity to view the crim-
inal act); Macias v. State, 673 So. 2d 176, 180-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
unnecessarily suggestive voice identification admissible because of indicia of reliability);
State v. Cromartie, 419 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding show-up to
several witnesses soon after commission of crime was suggestive, but necessary, and the
identification was reliable given opportunity to view perpetrator).
54 Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New
Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 109, 120-22 (2006) (noting confidence levels are not necessarily strongly corre-
lated with accuracy and can be infected by suggestion); Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need
to Revisit Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 Wyo. L.
REv. 189, 201 (2006) ("[M]emory of an event is subject to 'the forgetting curve,' which
shows that memory originally declines quickly and then at a more gradual rate, which
leave gaps in memory which witnesses often 'fill in' if questioned.").
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instance, the Jacksonville police department rules instruct officers who
are conducting photo identifications to include at least six photos,
keep witnesses separate, and avoid influencing them, but also state that
the distractor photos should look like the suspect (rather than the wit-
ness' description) and do not admonish the police to tell witnesses that
the perpetrator's picture may be absent from the array.55 Further-
more, the Jacksonville rules contain no provisions governing lineups. 56
The Orlando police department's regulations, which do cover lineups
as well as photo arrays, are otherwise very similar, and also tell officers
that "language such as 'I think' or 'It looks like' should not appear in
any written statement if the witness is certain of the identity."5 7 All of
the police regulations we obtained permitted one-on-one showups as
long as they occur within a certain time of arrest (e.g., two hours in
Orlando, four hours in Miami), regardless of whether less suggestive
procedures are feasible.5 8 Finally, while the Miami policy requires that
the conducting officer videotape or at least photograph the procedure,
the other policies do not, making post-procedure evaluation of police
conduct difficult. 59
In short, in Florida both the law and practice associated with po-
lice investigative procedures could be improved substantially if the goal
is to avoid conviction of innocent individuals. Elimination of abusive
interrogation techniques and adoption of the best identification proce-
dures would cost very little, either in monetary terms or in terms of lost
convictions of guilty people. In contrast, the gain in terms of greater
confidence in the reliability of confessions and identifications would
be substantial.
Scientific Evidence-DNA, Crime Labs, and Medical Examiners
Although the ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation
Project designated "DNA" and "crime labs/medical examiners" as sep-
arate categories to be investigated by the state Assessment Teams, these
topics are collapsed together here because both involve the scientific
collection, analysis and description of physical evidence. Scientific evi-
dence, explained by well-credentialed experts, can often be extremely
55 ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 14, at 20.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 20-21.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 22.
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powerful. As with police investigative techniques, it is crucial that such
evidence be as reliable as possible.
DNA testing has revolutionized the criminal justice system. Be-
cause it can provide objective proof of guilt and innocence, it has also
helped expose how interrogations, lineup procedures, prosecutorial
misconduct and other aspects of the criminal justice system can lead to
conviction of innocent people. Nationally, roughly 12% of those who
have been released from death row were cleared because of DNA evi-
dence. 6 But there is a flip side to such evidence. An improper DNA
testing procedure or incompetent testimony about DNA evidence can
also lead to improper convictions. 61 While at least two of Florida's ex-
onerees were cleared based on DNA testing,62 one other exoneree was
convicted in part because of flawed DNA evidence, which relied on an
untested matching technique and a possibly contaminated sample. 63
Other types of scientific evidence can also lead to wrongful convic-
tions. In the case of Robert Hayes, one of the two capital defendants
in Florida eventually cleared by DNA, an FBI hair analyst testified at
trial that hairs in the victim's mouth could not have been the white
victim's, because they came from an African-American (the race of the
defendant) .64 But later DNA testing revealed the hairs were the vic-
tim's.65 Similarly, Anthony Ray Peek's first murder conviction was over-
turned because hair identification evidence was shown to be false.66
Medical examiners have also given inaccurate testimony. For instance,
when she was the chief medical examiner in Pinellas and Pasco Coun-
ties, Joan Wood erroneously diagnosed shaken baby syndrome in two
60 Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Crisis in the American Death Penalty, 29 (2004),
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-
crisis-american-death-penalty.
61 Id. at 29-30.
62 Frank Lee Smith was cleared through DNA testing in 2000 (after he died of cancer
on death row). FLA. COMM'N ON CAPITAL CASES, CASE HISTORIES: A REVIEW OF 24 INDMD-
UALS RELEASED FROM DEATH Row 143 (2002), available at http://www.floridacapital
cases.state.fl.us/publications/innocentsproject.pdf [hereinafter FLA. COMM'N ON CAPI-
TAL CASES]. Rudolph Holton's conviction and sentence were overturned when DNA
tests conclusively excluded Holton as the contributor of the hair found in the murder
victim's mouth. State v. Holton, 835 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2002).
63 Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 264 (Fla. 1995) (finding that expert who testified for
the prosecution relied on a controversial matching technique and also might have con-
taminated the sample).
64 David Karp, The Innocence Defense, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at IA.
65 See id.
66 Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1986).
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separate first degree murder cases. 67 According to the Department of
Justice, another expert whose questionable testimony jeopardized sev-
eral homicide prosecutions, including one capital case, "sometimes tes-
tified beyond his expertise, misleading juries about the scientific basis
for his conclusions, misstating FBI policy or keeping notes that were
inadequate to support his forensic opinions."6
Mechanisms for avoiding these types of problems include statu-
tory provisions establishing a legal process for obtaining post-convic-
tion DNA testing, rules governing the proper maintenance of physical
evidence, accreditation requirements for the personnel in crime labo-
ratories and medical examiner offices, and strict guidelines on testing
procedures and the types of conclusions that can be drawn from test-
ing.69 Florida's success at implementing these protections has been
mixed.
Florida law does provide a procedure for both pre-trial and post-
conviction DNA testing, and even though petitioners must meet strict
requirements to obtain an evidentiary hearing on post-conviction mo-
tions, 7 Florida courts are relatively generous in interpreting the rules
and granting leaves to amend flawed petitions. 71 Less clear is the extent
to which a successful motion provides a meaningful chance at relief.
First, while Florida law requires that all physical evidence be main-
tained until at least sixty days after an individual is executed,72 the
courts have also held, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court holdings,7
that destruction of physical evidence before the defense has an oppor-
tunity to examine it is not a due process violation unless the destruc-
67 WILLIAM R. LEVESQUE, REVIEW OF BABY'S DEATH FREES FATHER, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at IA.
68 Sydney Freedberg, Reports Highlight More Tainted Testimony, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 3, 2001, at Al. See also Laurie P. Cohen, Strand of Evidence: FBI Crime-Lab Work
Emerges as New Issue in Famed Murder Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1997, at Al.
69 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at 56-63.
70 See FLA. STAT. § 925.11(2)(c) (2008); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c) (2) (2007) (stating if
a movant fails to meet any of six pleading requirements, the judge may summarily dis-
miss the claim without a hearing, and even a legally sufficient motion may be denied if
its allegations are conclusively refuted by the record on appeal).
71 See, e.g., Girley v. State, 935 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Peterson v. State,
919 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). But see Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536,
567-71 (Fla. 2007) (interpreting narrowly the grounds on which an evidentiary hearing
concerning the need for testing forensic evidence may be granted).
72 See FLA. STAT. § 925.11(4) (b) (2008).
73 See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
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tion is an intentional effort to prevent exoneration; 4 thus, as a
practical matter, police have significant discretion with respect to pre-
serving evidence. Second, although all of the state's crime labs and
many of the local labs are accredited, none are equipped to perform
mitochondrial or Y-STR testing, which is necessary for old, degraded
evidence.7 5 Third, as previously noted, despite the protections that ex-
ist, serious mistakes have been made, which suggests that greater dili-
gence is needed in this area.
76
The situation with respect to medical examiners is even more
troubling. Florida does not require that medical examiners be accred-
ited and, as of 2006 only four of the state's twenty-four offices had
sought such accreditation. 77 Although a statewide commission over-
sees all medical examiners, accredited and nonaccredited, Joan Wood,
the Pinellas and Pasco county examiner mentioned above who was in-
volved in two misdiagnoses (and who was forced to retired after a mis-
diagnosis in still another case), was chair of that commission for six
years, which calls into question the quality of its supervision.7 8 An ac-
creditation requirement and more rigorous monitoring of evidence
maintenance and testing procedures would go a long way toward mini-
74 See Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 509-10 (Fla. 2003) (capital case holding that
even though police destruction of hair found on victim was against departmental regu-
lations, defendant failed to establish bad faith because officers had reasonably believed
hair belonged to victim); Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1995) (capital case
holding that the defendant failed to show bad faith in a police detective's failure to
preserve a pair of pants found at a crime scene, because the detective believed they did
not have evidentiary value).
75 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at 63.
76 The Assessment Team found at least two other examples of shoddy scientific exper-
tise. See Lyda Longa, Defendants Get Chance to Challenge FBI Lab Tests, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 4,
2000, at Metro 2 (FBI lab technician Jacqueline Blake was accused of failing to follow
required procedures for analyzing DNA, over a period exceeding two years; she was
later fired); Bill Hirschman, Sherriff's Staff Raising DNA Standards; Goal is to Increase Accu-
racy After Errors in Murder Case, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 2003, at 1B (DNA analyst
Lynn Baird at the Broward County Sheriffs Office Crime Lab accidentally mixed DNA
from a murder case and a separate rape case; Baird was eventually reassigned and mur-
der charges in the associated case were dropped, although the prosecutor said the lab
mistake did not play a role).
77 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at 103.
78 See MEDICAL EXAMINER'S APPARENT MISTAKES PUT MAN IN JAIL, ABC ACTION NEws
REPORT, Nov. 21, 2002.
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mizing the most egregious scientific errors that have occurred in capi-
tal cases. 79
Prosecutorial Professionalism
Under the Constitution, prosecutors are obligated to provide ex-
culpatory information to the defense, and of course must also refrain
from using perjured testimony (the "Brady rule")."0 Florida's Rules of
Criminal Procedure also require the prosecution to disclose all of its
witnesses as well as "a list of the names and addresses of all persons
known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to
any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evi-
dence to be presented at trial."8 Finally, Florida's ethical code adds to
the prosecutor's obligations by requiring production not only of excul-
patory and relevant trial information but of any information that tends
to "mitigate" the sentence.8 2
At least three of Florida's exonerees were convicted at trials in
which the prosecutor knowingly withheld exculpatory information,"
and another was convicted at a trial during which the prosecutor know-
ingly used false testimony.8 4 Several other exonerees were convicted on
the basis of testimony later determined to be perjured. 5 Although in
these latter cases no finding was made that the prosecution knew the
testimony was false, in many of them the testimony was plagued with
79 For state-of-the-art standards, see CODIS (Combined DNA Index System), Quality
Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, available at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/pdf/testinglab.pdf.
80 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
81 FiA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(b) (1) (A) (2008).
82 FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT, 4-3.8(c).
83 The three were Freddie Pitts, Rudolph Holton and Juan Melendez. See State v.
Pitts, 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (reversing previous opinion based on
confession of error by state Attorney General concerning prosecutor's suppression of
statement from one of state's witnesses); Death Penalty Information Center, www.death
penaltyinfo.org/innocence-cases-1994-2003 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (Holton's first
conviction for rape and murder overturned in 2001 by a circuit court, which found that
the state withheld evidence pointing to another perpetrator); FLA. COMM'N ON CAPITAL
CASES, supra note 62, at 76 (in 2001, a circuit court overturned Melendez's murder
conviction after determining that prosecutors withheld evidence about another
suspect).
84 See Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986) (knowing use of false
testimony).
85 Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1989).
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inconsistencies or came from jailhouse snitches or co-defendants with
obviously self-serving motives.86
Unethical, if not illegal, conduct by prosecutors is apparently
quite frequent in capital cases. In Gore v. State, the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
This case is one more unfortunate demonstration that "there are [still]
some [prosecutors] who would ignore our warnings concerning the need
for exemplary professional and ethical conduct in the courtroom." As we
did in [five other capital cases], we once again repeat our admonition:
"[W]e are deeply disturbed as a Court by continuing violations of
prosecutorial duty, propriety and restraint. We have recently addressed
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in several death penalty cases....
It ill becomes those who represent the state in the application of its lawful
penalties to themselves ignore the precepts of their profession and their
office."
87
Despite these explicit concerns, in virtually none of the cases in
which prosecutors misbehaved were disciplinary measures taken, as far
as the Assessment Team could tell.8 8 Indeed, we were only able to find
one case where a prosecutor in a capital case was referred for disci-
pline 89 (although the nature of the state's filing system makes any kind
of comprehensive statement about such matters difficult 0 ). Onejudge
in a lower Florida court has even intimated that such referrals are fruit-
less, given the weak response by the Florida Bar:
[W] e have no illusions that [referring a lawyer who committed "egregious
conduct" to the Bar] will have any practical effect. Our skepticism is
86 See id. See also Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2000); Green v. State, 688 So.
2d 301 (Fla. 1996); Scott v. State, 581 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1991); Brown v. State, 515 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1987).
87 Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original, "[five other capital cases]" added).
88 In at least two capital cases, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly found a violation
of the Code of Professional Conduct. In neither case did the violation affect the out-
come, nor did the Court refer the matter to the Bar. See, e.g., Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d
1201 (Fla. 1985) (prosecutorial interview of unrepresented defendant); Darden v. State,
329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976) (prosecutor's remarks during trial).
89 See Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1999) (referring prosecutor to Bar based on
misconduct during closing argument in a capital case). The local bar committee de-
clined to pursue the case, but the state Bar overruled the committee and a 30-day sus-
pension resulted, although it ran concurrently with a year-long suspension the lawyer
had already received for a separate, non-capital case in which she presented a witness
under a false name. See Florida Bar v. Cox, No. SCO1-2148 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2002).
90 The Bar was only able to provide files on cases where the capital defendant made a
complaint. Complaints filed by judges or defense attorneys would not have been
included.
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caused by the fact that, of the many occasions in which members of this
court-reluctantly and usually only after agonizing over what we thought
was the seriousness of doing so-have found it appropriate to make such
a referral about a lawyer's conduct in litigation .... none has resulted in
the public imposition of any discipline-not even a reprimand.... Speak-
ing for himself alone, the present writer has grown tired of felling trees in
the ethically empty forest which seems so much a part of the professional
landscape in this area. Perhaps the time has come to apply.., the rule of
conservation of judicial resources which teaches that a court should not
require a useless act, even of itself."
Of course, even if prosecutors are not ordinarily disciplined by the
Bar, an ethical violation that is also a violation of the law can lead to
reversal. In the capital case of Rogers v. State,92 for instance, the Florida
Supreme Court held that withholding statements of the state's chief
witness, combined with evidence of witness coaching, was reversible er-
ror. In Cardona v. State,93 the Court held in another capital case that the
prosecutor's failure to turn over statements that could have been used
to impeach the co-defendant, a key witness in the state's case, violated
the Brady rule. A study of all criminal cases involving prosecutorial
misconduct between 1970 and 2003 found that Florida courts reversed
multiple convictions for withholding evidence (forty cases), manipula-
tion of evidence (four), and using perjured testimony (two) 4
More often than not, however, prosecutorial misconduct is
deemed harmless. In Guzman v. State,95 the Court held that, although
payment of $500 "reward" to a witness for her testimony was
"favorable" evidence that should have been disclosed by the prosecu-
tion, its disclosure would not have affected the outcome of the trial.
Similarly, in Way v. State,96 the Court found that photos that could have
been used to impeach an expert witness of the state in a capital case
were "favorable" but found that there was no reasonable probability
the outcome of the case would have changed had they been disclosed.
In the above-referenced study of capital and noncapital cases, miscon-
duct by the prosecutor was found to be harmless 55% of the time.9 7
And the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a prosecutorial
91 Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., 778 So. 2d 443, 444-45 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(internal citations omitted) (Judge Schwartz).
92 See Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373, 384-85 (Fla. 2001).
93 See Cardona v. State, 826 So. 2d 968, 981 (Fla. 2002).
94 Michael J. Sniffen, Study Tells of Cases Tainted by Prosecutors; Thousands of Rulings
Affected by Misconduct, Researchers Say, S. FiA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 26, 2003, at A4.
95 Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003).
96 Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 915 (Fla. 2000).
97 See Sniffen, supra note 94.
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violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not require
reversal unless it "was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial." 8
It must also be recognized that even if some types of "procedural"
errors (e.g., commenting on the defendant's failure to take the stand;
inappropriate closing statements) can be dismissed as harmless in
terms of trial outcomes, they can still lead to inappropriate death
sentences, which the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized are to be
reserved for the worst murderers. 99 For instance, a comment about the
defendant's failure to take the stand at trial may not appreciably influ-
ence a trial jury that already has sufficient evidence of guilt, but could
well still prejudice the jury's sentencing deliberations. Unfortunately,
the Florida Supreme Court, once again following the Supreme Court's
lead,1"' repeatedly finds these types of procedural errors harmless,
which sends prosecutors the message that they may be committed with
impunity." 1
Prosecutorial professionalism can be enhanced by adopting two
simple, inexpensive measures. First, if prosecutors appear to act un-
ethically, they should be reported to the Bar by the relevant court and
the Bar should take appropriate action. Reprimand, suspension or dis-
barment is likely to have much more of a deterrent effect on a prosecu-
tor than a reversal or a finding that the prosecutor's error was
harmless. Second, errors that are repeatedly committed should no
longer be considered harmless. Florida courts can use their supervi-
98 State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984).
99 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (stating a capital crime must re-
flect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder").
100 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (repeated prosecutorial
comment on defendant's silence that is considered harmless should be handled
through ethical sanctions, not reversal).
101 With respect to comments on defendant's silence found harmless, see, e.g., Chan-
dler v. State, 534 So. 2d 701, 703-4 (Fla. 1988) (prosecutor's penalty phase comment on
defendant's silence); Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 107 (Fla. 2003) (prosecutor's use of
Golden Rule argument during trial closing); Jones v. State, 748 So. 2d 1012, 1021 (Fla.
1999) (detective's comment on defendant's invocation of silence during trial harm-
less); Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. 1994) (comment on defendant's trial
silence). With respect to closing argument during trial or sentencing, see e.g., Rose v.
State, 787 So. 2d 786, 797 (Fla. 2001) (inappropriate remarks during closing argument
harmless); James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1234 (Fla. 1997) (same); Shellito v. State,
701 So. 2d 837, 842 (Fla. 1997) (same); Heynard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 250 (Fla.
1996) (same); Hodges v. State, 595 So. 2d 929, 934 (Fla. 1992) (same); Irizarry v. State,
496 So. 2d 822, 825 (Fla. 1986) (same); Robinson v. State, 702 So. 2d 213, 214, 217 (Fla.
1997) (same); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 208 (Fla. 2002) (same).
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sory power to apply a "one bite at the apple" rule, either statewide, or
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.
A separate focus of the Assessment Team regarding prosecutors
centered on charging practices. Florida has twenty state's attorneys,
one in each judicial circuit.10 2 Over 70% of the 393 people currently on
death row were sentenced to death in one of seven circuits, represent-
ing only 35% of Florida's prosecutor's offices. 103 In terms of 2008 pop-
ulation numbers, a death sentence is seven times more likely in the
Fourth Judicial Circuit (1 out of 19,000) than in the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit (1 out of 133,000), with the per capita death sentence rate in
three circuits one or more standard deviations above the mean and in
three other circuits a standard deviation below the mean (suggesting
significant variation in charging and/or sentencing tendencies). 10 4 Of
course, there may well be completely innocent explanations for these
numbers, including population characteristics, size and growth over
the four-decade period in which these death sentences were imposed.
But sophisticated studies in a number of states have confirmed that
charging practices in capital cases vary significantly among prosecutor
offices. 10 5 And research in Florida suggests that some prosecutors have
102 Office of the State Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Brevard and
Seminole Counties, http://sal8.state.fl.us/general/empabout.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2009).
103 Florida Dep't of Corrections, Death Row Roster, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/active
inmates/deathrowroster.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
104 Id. There are also other noteworthy variations. For instance, the First Circuit con-
sists of Escambia, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, and Walton counties. Escambia County had no
death sentences until 1989; it has since had twelve. Okaloosa County had no death
sentences until 1990, it has since had twelve. Santa Rosa County had no death sentences
until 1991; it has since had six. Walton County had no death sentences until 1992; it
has since had four. Id Throughout this period, from January, 1969 through January,
2005, the same person was State Attorney for the First Circuit.
105 See, e.g., John Blume et al., The Death Penalty in Delaware: An Empirical Study, at 9
(2008) (unpublished), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1207882 (finding that two
thirds of Delaware's death sentences were imposed in New Castle County, 29% were
imposed in Kent County and only 5% of the death sentences resulted from murders
which occurred in Sussex County); Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen Thaman,
Life and Death Decisions: Prosecutorial Discretion and Capital Punishment in Missouri, at 76
(2008) (unpublished), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107456 (review of 1046
homicide cases in Missouri found that "[p]rosecutors in different counties exercise
their discretion in very different ways," leading to substantial variation in charging and
sentencing practices in different counties across the state with some variation attributa-
ble to race of victim and race of defendant but more significant disparities based on
geography); Raymond Paternoster et. al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland's Death Sen-
tencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction, (Final Report), tbl.8
(2003), available at http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf (docu-
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been motivated by racial bias in deciding whom to charge with a capi-
tal offense. 1 6 This empirical information, combined with the fact that
few prosecutor offices in Florida appear to have written policies gov-
erning the charging decision, led the Assessment Team to make the
following explicit recommendation (the first of eleven to be reported
in this article): "The State of Florida should develop statewide proto-
cols for determining who may be charged with a capital crime, in an
effort to standardize the charging decision."10 7
Defense Services
Florida has a public defender system, meaning that most capital
defendants are represented by salaried defense attorneys.0 8 When the
public defender office has a conflict (e.g., because it has represented
or is representing a co-defendant, a victim, or a victim's relative), "con-
flict counsel" is appointed from a registry maintained by the clerk of
court. 10 9 If there is a conviction in cases represented by a public de-
fender, a different public defender from the appellate division brings
the appeal.110 In cases where conflict counsel litigated the trial, the
same attorney brings the appeal unless the ground for conflict no
longer exists, in which case the public defender appellate division usu-
ally takes over the case.1 State and federal post-conviction petitions
are handled by salaried attorneys from the Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel (CCRC) in the southern and central parts of the state, and by
private "registry attorneys" in the northern part of the state (the latter
menting significant unadjusted geographic disparities in prosecutorial charging deci-
sions in Maryland).
106 Bob Levenson & Debbie Salamone, Prosecutors See Death Penalty in Black and White,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 1992, at Al; Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race
and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'v REv. 587, 618-19 (1985)
(stating that "[i] t appears that not only are [Florida] prosecutors sometimes motivated
to seek a death sentence for reasons that reflect the racial configuration of the crime,
but that they do so in a way that greatly reduces the possibilities for discovering evi-
dence of discrimination and arbitrariness when only later stages of the judicial process
are examined.").
107 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi. See Office of the Ariz. Attorney General, Capi-
tal Case Commission Final Report, 17 (2002) (recommending that all prosecutors in-
volved in trying capital cases adopt written policies for identifying cases in which to seek
the death penalty, including policies on "soliciting or accepting defense input before
deciding to seek the death penalty.").
108 See FLA. STAT. § 27.51(1) (a) (2008).
109 See id. §§ 27.40(3) (a) & 27.511(5) (2008).
110 See id. § 27.51(4) (2008).
1I See id. § 27.5303(4)(a) (2008).
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arrangement constituting an experiment by the state in an effort to
save money).112 Any retrials or re-sentencings that result from the post-
conviction process are handled by the public defender or conflict
counsel." 3
Two aspects of defense services in Florida particularly bothered
the Assessment Team: qualification requirements for post-conviction
counsel, and reimbursement schedules for private attorneys (i.e., con-
flict and registry attorneys). With respect to qualification require-
ments, lead trial counsel must have practiced criminal law for five years
and served as lead counsel in at least nine "complex" trials, three or
more of which involved a murder prosecution." 4 But post-conviction
counsel need only three years of criminal practice experience, with
only five felony jury trials under their belt."5 These latter requirements
fall well short of the basic qualifications recommended in the ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, which also require significant training in a
number of specific areas (e.g., involving mental disability, scientific evi-
dence), as well as retraining every two years.11 6
Attorney reimbursement was an even more significant concern. At
the time the Assessment Team drafted its report, Florida law limited
conflict trial counsel to a maximum of $3,500.117 In 2007, perhaps
partly in response to the Assessment Team's recommendations (de-
scribed below), the Legislature raised the maximum to $15,000."1 The
increased cap is obviously a great improvement, but it still only equals
the lowest cap of any death penalty state, most of which do not set
maxima. 119 Although the Florida Supreme Court has held that the stat-
utory cap may be exceeded in "extraordinary and unusual cases, 120 the
new legislation states that the flat fee is generally to "comprise the full
and complete compensation for private court-appointed counsel"121
and that the extraordinary-and-unusual threshold is met only under
112 See id. §§ 27.702(2); 27.701(2); 27.710(1) (2008).
113 See id. § 27.511(8) (2008).
114 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.112(f) (2007).
115 See FA. STAT. §§ 27.701(1) & 27.704(2) (2008).
116 See American Bar Association: ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 961-62, 976 (2003).
117 See FA. STAT. § 27.5304(2) (2008).
118 See id. § 27.5304(3) (a) (4) (2008).
119 See Spangenberg Group, Rates of Compensation for Court-Appointed Counsel: A State-by-
State Overview, 16-23 (June 2007) (on file with the Review).
120 Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Fla. 1986).
121 FIA. STAT. § 27.5304(11) (2008).
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limited circumstances involving a certain number of hours and wit-
nesses;122 further, even if met, this exception only permits up to a 200%
increase above the flat fee, to the extent necessary to avoid making the
fee "confiscatory."12 Post-conviction registry attorney fees are also
capped, at $84,000 (again with an "extraordinary and unusual" ca-
veat) .124 According to one estimate, this sum amounts to payment for
only a quarter of the average number of hours attorneys spend on a
capital case after denial of direct appeal by the Florida Supreme
Court;125 furthermore, this amount is to be shared among attorneys if
there is more than one.126 Lawsuits arguing that these types of limita-
tions are unfair have been uniformly unsuccessful. 127
Others who know Florida's death penalty process well have re-
cently noted the same deficiencies. The federal courts have been un-
willing to certify that Florida has established a mechanism for ensuring
competent post-conviction counsel that meets the requirements of the
122 See id. § (12) (b) (1) (2008).
123 Id. § (12)(d).
124 See id. § 27.711(4).
125 See Spangenberg Group, Amended Time & Expense Analysis of Post-Conviction Capital
Cases in Florida 16 (1998) (on file with the Review).
126 See FiA. STAT. § 27.711(4) (h) (2008).
127 On several occasions, the CCRC has asserted that it could not provide effective
assistance of counsel because of insufficient funding and, as it stated in one petition,
because it was "overworked and forced to labor under severe time constraints." White v.
Singletary, 663 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 1995). The Florida Supreme Court has refused
to grant relief, while noting that exceptional circumstances would warrant additional
compensation. See Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 1988); White, 663 So. 2d
at 1325; Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999). See also Olive v. Maas, 811
So. 2d 644, 651-54 (Fla. 2002), where the Florida Supreme Court rejected claims that
the registry system did not adequately compensate attorneys, noting that in previous
cases it had held that courts could pay attorneys more than the cap under exceptional
circumstances. The Florida legislature, concerned that the Olive decision would turn
every death penalty case into an "exceptional" one, then instructed the Commission to
take any attorney off the registry who would not agree to the maximum (which, as
indicated above, is $84,000 from the end of appeal to the ultimate resolution of the
case). See FLA. STAT. § 27.711(8) (2008).
Several attorneys have attempted to obtain fees in excess of the local rates of com-
pensation by claiming that the rates were "confiscatory" of their time. They generally
lose. See, e.g., Sheppard & White v. City ofJacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925, 931 (Fla. 2002);
Bobbitt v. State, 726 So. 2d 848, 851-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Leon County v. Mc-
Clure, 541 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds denied sub nom.
Harper v. Leon County, 551 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1989); Bd. of Cty. Comm'ns of Hillsbor-
ough Cty. v. Lopez, 518 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Hillsborough Cty. v. Un-
terberger, 534 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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federal Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 12 (admittedly,
a threshold that only one state has met 29). In July 2008, Gerald Kogan,
a Florida Supreme Court justice from 1987 to 1998, argued for a mora-
torium on executions in Florida in part because of "Florida's woefully
inadequate system of providing those accused of capital crimes with
representation at trial."130 He added, "[t] he bar for inclusion in Flor-
ida's Capital Collateral Registry . . . is set embarrassingly low, and re-
quires very little of participating attorneys."'3'
As Justice Kogan suggested, there is substantial evidence that,
whatever one might think about Florida's efforts to assure quality de-
fense representation, its capital defendants often do not receive it.1 2
The proof comes from the Florida Supreme Court itself. For instance,
in the six years immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984
decision in Strickland v. Washington,33 which arguably made claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel more difficult to win, the Florida Su-
preme Court granted relief on that ground in nine capital cases, and
the Eleventh Circuit, which oversees Florida, awarded relief in four-
teen out of forty-one such cases out of Florida.3 4
The Assessment Team Report recounts numerous examples of
poor trial lawyering throughout the 1990s as well, particularly by pri-
vate attorneys. In one case, the trial judge removed two defense lawyers
128 See Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1143-44 (D. Fla. 1996). The court gave
as a separate reason for disqualification the fact that, notwithstanding several improve-
ments in the representation system as a result of legislation and rule changes, "Florida
still has a substantial backlog of unassigned indigent defendants seeking post-conviction
relief." Id. at 1146. The Eleventh Circuit remanded in light of subsequent modifica-
tions in the rules made by the Florida legislature. 147 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1998). But as
of 2004, that court was still saying "it is not clear whether the State of Florida has satis-
fied [AEDPA's] criteria." Kelley v. Sec. Dep't Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1340 (lth Cir.
2004). As of 2005, the U.S. Attorney General makes the approval decision under
AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b) (1) (A).
129 Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 998, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Arizona had
in place a system for appointment of post-conviction counsel sufficient to allow it to
"opt in" and enjoy procedural benefits offered by AEDPA).
130 Gerald Kogan, Florida's Justice System Fails on Many Fronts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
1, 2008, http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/essays/article652532.ece.
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
134 See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just a Nominal Right?,
NAT'L L.J., Jun. 11, 1990, at 42.
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because of their incompetence and "deceit."135 In another, the defen-
dant's lead lawyer was a former prosecutor who had been suspended
once and publicly reprimanded another time, while the two assistants
in the case had a year's experience between them. 13 6 In a similar vein,
in 1997 the Florida Supreme Court reversed a capital conviction and
sentence because of the corrupt relationship between the judge and
the attorney, who was appointed by the judge after the public de-
fender's office was barred from the representation by a conflict.13 7 The
same year, Florida Supreme CourtJustice Harry Anstead expressed his
frustration over the poor quality of representation at the trial level
more generally:
The undisputed facts in this case present a blatant example of coun-
sel's failure to investigate and prepare a penalty phase defense. Once
again, we have a lawyer appointed who had absolutely no experience in
capital cases .... [I] n this case we have an inexperienced lawyer who has
conceded that he was unprepared and, in his words "caught with [his]
pants down," because he had erroneously assumed that the trial court
would grant a lengthy continuance between the guilt phase and the pen-
alty phase of the proceedings.138
Post-conviction representation has also been very uneven. The
mid-state CCRC office was dogged by charges of nepotism and unethi-
cal conduct at its inception. 1 9 And in one of the appeals filed by that
office, the Florida Supreme Court heatedly criticized the lawyers for
the poor quality of their work, pointing out that "the majority of the
issues raised were conclusory in nature and made it very difficult and
burdensome for this Court to conduct a meaningful review." 140
Even more troubling are accounts of the representation provided
by the private "registry attorneys" in Florida's northern district. Law-
yers working with that office have admitted they were unqualified,
missed federal filing deadlines (apparently because they were unaware
of them), and filed petitions containing no citations to the trial or ap-
135 Marcia Coyle, Suit: Death Defense Is a Sham; Claim is Florida Provides Lawyers But Makes
It So They Can't Save Inmates, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 21, 1998, at Al.
136 See id.
137 Robinson v. State, 702 So. 2d 213, 217 (Fla. 1997).
a38 Van Poyck v. State, 694 So. 2d 686, 699-700 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
139 See generally Sydney P. Freedberg, State's Death-Row Lawyers in Turmoil, Under Attack,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 2, 1999, at IA (describing creation of and controversy sur-
rounding CCR regional offices).
140 Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 256 n.5 (Fla. 1999).
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pellate record or any judicial authority;141 some, apparently over-
whelmed, have simply "bailed out" of their assigned case.1 42
Government officials have conceded that only a fraction of these attor-
neys were willing to take cases to federal court,143 and that supervising
the scores of attorneys involved is not possible. 144 Referring to these
private registry attorneys, Florida Supreme Court Justice Raoul
Cantero stated in 2005 that cases they filed with the Court involved
"the worst lawyering I've seen" and "the worst briefs that I have
read."1 45 He also stated, "I'm not sure we have enough quality lawyers
out there that would be able to pick up the slack."1 46
As with prosecutors, reporting defense attorneys to the Bar for un-
ethical behavior is relatively rare. In State v. Murray, the Florida Su-
preme Court stated that "when there is 'overzealousness' or
misconduct on the part of either the prosecutor or defense lawyer, it is
proper for either trial or appellate courts to exercise their supervisory
powers by registering their disapproval, or, in appropriate cases, refer-
ring the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary investigation." 147
However, in none of the fifteen capital cases the Assessment Team ran-
domly selected in which a Florida court found a deficiency in the attor-
ney's conduct did the opinion state that the lawyer should be referred
to the Bar.141
In light of the foregoing observations about defense counsel in
capital cases, the Assessment Team adopted the following three
recommendations:
(1) The State of Florida should take steps to ensure that all conflict trial
counsel in death penalty cases are properly compensated. Specifically,
the State of Florida should (a) eliminate the statutory fee cap, thus giving
judges the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis the appropriate
amount of compensation, and (b) allow greater flexibility for obtaining
interim payments for services; (2) The State of Florida should adopt qual-
141 SeeJo Becker, System May Be Slowing Appeals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jul. 17, 2000, at
lB.
142 Jan Pudlow, The Pros and Cons of Privatizing Death Penalty Appeals, FLA. BAR NEws,
Mar. 1, 2003, at 7.
143 Panel Told Closing CCRCs Would Cause Delays, FLA. BAR NEws, March 15, 2003, at 10.
144 Pudlow, supra note 142.
145 Marc Caputo, Justice Blasts Lawyers Over Death Row Appeals, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28,
2005, at lB.
1
46 Id.
147 State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984).
148 ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT, supra note 14, at 79-83. In one case, the prosecutor filed
a complaint and an investigation of counsel's alleged conflict resulted. Burnside v.
State, 656 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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ification standards for capital collateral registry attorneys and attorney
monitoring procedures that are consistent with the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA
Guidelines). In the alternative, it should reinstitute the Capital Collateral
Regional Counsel Office in the Northern Region of Florida, thereby elim-
inating reliance on registry counsel in non-conflict cases; (3) The State of
Florida should adopt compensation standards for capital collateral regis-
try attorneys that are consistent with the ABA Guidelines.
149
Unlike the other recommendations made to this point in this arti-
cle, these recommendations would require significant expenditures.
But policymakers should also take into account the fact that good lawy-
ering at the front-end can reduce costs connected with the post-convic-
tion process. Especially when they are also assured adequate
investigative and expert assistance, 150 good, well-paid trial lawyers not
only are less likely to generate ineffective assistance of counsel claims
but also are more likely to catch deficiencies in the state's investigative
and charging process at a time when they can still be corrected or ad-
justed for, instead of years later when an expensive retrial or re-sen-
tencing may be the only effective remedy. And, as the comments of
the Florida Supreme Court suggest, qualified, well-paid post-conviction
attorneys can enhance the efficiency of the litigation process through
precise identification of issues and precedent. In the long run, money
spent on defense attorneys is a good investment in capital cases from
both a fiscal and fairness standpoint.
The Judicial Role During Trial and the Post-Conviction Process
This section combines three of the twelve areas the Assessment
Team was asked to address: judicial independence; the direct appeal
process; and the post-conviction process. The focus here will be judi-
cial independence. As the discussion below reveals, a lack of such in-
149 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at ix-x.
150 In Florida, trial attorneys are entitled to compensation for "reasonable and neces-
sary expenses." See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304(1) (2008). These include court reporting and
transcription fees, the costs of expert witnesses "summoned to appear," the costs of
mental health professionals appointed to evaluate the defendant and "required in a
court hearing," reasonable transportation and travel expenses, "reasonable library and
electronic legal research services, other than a public law library," and "reasonable pre-
trial consultation fees and costs." See FLA. STAT. §§ 29.006, 29.007 (2008). However, the
statutes do not specifically provide funding for investigators. Post-conviction attorneys
are entitled to one or more investigators, paid at $40/hour up to a maximum of
$15,000, as well as miscellaneous expenses up to a maximum of $15,000. FLA. STAT.
§ 27.711(5) & (6) (2008).
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dependence can have a significant impact on all stages of the process,
from trial and sentencing, through direct appeal and habeas review.
Trial judges in Florida are elected, and stand for re-election every
six years. 151 Judges on the Florida Supreme Court and the District
Courts of Appeal are appointed by the Governor from a list compiled
by an independent commission, but are subject to retention elections
at the next general election and every six years thereafter. 1 2 While in
theory judges at all levels are insulated from political influence, the
elective process may have subtle and not so subtle impacts on the out-
comes of individual cases and death penalty jurisprudence more
generally.
The Assessment Team found a number of accounts illustrating
how election campaigns might influence judicial behavior. A Florida
Supreme Court justice recalled that when he was responsible for as-
signments as a trial court judge,judges facing re-election asked him for
assignments to criminal cases because it would help get their names in
the press.'53 In another campaign, a judicial candidate ran a TV ad in
which he was endorsed by the father of a slain victim, as well as by the
investigating sheriff, in a case likely to be tried in the candidate's judi-
cial circuit.154 Probably the best-known judicial campaign in Florida oc-
curred in connection with the merit-retention election of Florida
Supreme Court Justice Rosemary Barkett in 1992. In advertisements
sponsored by the National Rifle Association, law enforcement groups,
and related organizations, Barkett was repeatedly criticized for her
opinions in capital cases, despite the fact that she voted with the
Court's majority in those cases 91% of the time.155 Two years earlier,
then Chief Justice Leander Shaw faced opposition from anti-abortion
activists and "law-and-order" groups upset with rulings of the Court,
including those involving the death penalty.1 56
151 See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b) (3) (c).
152 See id. §§ 10(a), II(a).
153 Electing Judges Is Poor Policy, Overton Tells Panel, FLA. BAR. NEWS, May 1, 1989, at 4.
154 See Tom Lyons, Judicial Candidate Moreland Found Way to Be Noticed, And Should Be,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2004, at BS1.
155 See Lucy Morgan, Persistence Marks Barkett Fray, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, TAMPA ED.,
Oct. 21, 1992, at IB; Jan Pudlow, Law Enforcement Splits on Barkett, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, Sept. 9, 1992, at C1.
156 Randolph Pendleton, Victim's Brother Wants ChiefJustice Removed, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
Sept. 11, 1990, at B1.
[Vol. 1: 17
HeinOnline  -- 1 Elon L. Rev. 44 2009
The Death Penalty in Florida
Although apparently no appellate level judge has lost an election
in Florida because of death penalty rulings, 157 these and similar criti-
cisms of judges during election campaigns may have had less obvious
effects. Professor Webster pointed out that both Barkett and Shaw
spent $300,000 on their retention "campaigns," and that both received
only about 60% of the vote, compared to much higher percentages for
colleagues who were not challenged. 15 He also describes a survey of
judges subject to periodic retention revealing that "three-fifths be-
lieve [d] judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judi-
cial behavior."159
A more subtle interaction between the executive, legislative and
judicial branches is described in the following passage:
In the early 1990s, the Florida Supreme Court, a highly visible insti-
tution, especially with respect to its death penalty jurisprudence, devel-
oped a meaningful system of comparative proportionality review that
relied on a rich and transparent database with well reasoned opin-
ions .... [D]uring the 1990s, the court vacated 19% (32/170) of the
death cases it reviewed on [the proportionality] issue .... However, the
practice was scaled back dramatically in 2000 after the Florida court came
under severe political attack from the Governor and the Republican-con-
trolled legislature for allegedly slowing unreasonably the pace of the ex-
ecutions in state. The 19% vacation rate on the proportionality issue in
the 1990s dropped to 3% (3/97) between 2000 and 2003. The message
from the experience of the Florida court is clear. Whatever a court's com-
mitment to selective and consistent death sentencing may be, top-down,
highly visible, and aggressive review practices may carry distinct political
risks.
160
Other research confirms that, in the past decade, reversal rates in Flor-
ida capital cases continued to drop, 161 and use of procedural default
rules to bar post-conviction claims has increased.162
157 See Ann W. O'Neill, Supreme Court Justices Face Voter Review; Two Bush Appointees Hop-
ingfor Retention, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 4, 2004, at lB.
158 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 37 (1995).
159 Id.
160 David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capi-
tal Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1411,
1463-64 (2004).
161 In the ten years through 2000 the reversal rate on direct appeal was roughly 40%.
More recent years have seen reversal rates of 37% (2001) and 20% (2003). SeeJudge
O.H. Eaton, Jr., Capital Punishment: An Examination of Current Issues and Trends and How
These Developments May Impact the Death Penalty in Florida, 34 STETSON L. REv. 9, 16
(2004).
162 This increase was evident even in the 1980s. See Ruthann Robson & Michael Mello,
Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Threat" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and
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The prospect of a re-election campaign might also interact with
the Florida practice, almost unique among death penalty states, of al-
lowing judges to override capital jury recommendations with respect to
sentencing. 163 Consistent with the results of a nationwide survey find-
ing that elections influence capital sentencing decisions, 164 Bright and
Keenan's study of Florida death penalty cases found a statistically sig-
nificant correlation between judicial overrides of life sentence recom-
mendations and the occurrence of judicial elections. 165 These authors
also describe three Florida judges who seemed particularly eager to
override life sentence recommendations under circumstances that sug-
gested prejudicial pro-death penalty bias. 166 Dieter describes a fourth
Floridajudge who overrode a unanimous jury recommendation for life
and, two decades later when the conviction was overturned, "offered to
come back from his retired status to hear the case, despite the fact that
he had made recent comments to the press about [the defendant's]
Independent State Grounds, and florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REV. 87, 132 (1988).
Since then the trend has continued. Although the Court struck down a legislative at-
tempt to shorten post-conviction litigation, Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (2000),
it upheld against constitutional attack a one-year time limitation on post-conviction
claims. See Amendments to FLA. R. GRIM. PRO., 3.851 (d) (1), 3.852 and 3.993, 772 So. 2d
488, 491 (Fla. 2000). Further, it rarely grants exceptions to that rule, see Porter v. State,
653 So. 2d 374, 377 (Fla. 1995); Mills v. State, 684 So. 2d 801, 804-05 (Fla. 1996);John-
son v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (Fla. 2001), even holding (albeit consistently with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent on federal habeas) that ineffective post-conviction
counsel claims "do not present a valid basis for relief." See, e.g., Vining v. State, 827 So.
2d 201, 215 (Fla. 2002); Arbalaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 919 (Fla. 2000).
163 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3),(4) (2008).
164 Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the Amer-
ican States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 495-97 (1995) (state judges more likely to uphold death
sentences in last two years of their term).
165 See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 760, 779,
793-96 (1995). See also Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the
Jury Override, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1017, 1043-44 (1999).
166 See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 980-81, 981 n.12 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing Judge's Oliffs overrides ofjury life sentence recommendations in four
cases, in all of which he found aggravating factors in clear violation of Florida law);
DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH Row
414-18 (Times Books 1995) (describing Judge Rose's override of a unanimous life sen-
tence recommendation in the case of Doug McCray, and the eventual reversal of that
conviction after seventeen years in the Florida state courts); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d
1483, 1487 (lth Cir. 1995) (describing Judge Stanley's statement to a clerk that he was
changing the venue to another county that had "good, fair minded people here who
would listen and consider the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-bitch" at which
point the judge "would send Porter to the chair;" Stanley eventually overrode the jury's
subsequent unanimous recommendation for a life sentence).
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guilt."167 Whether worried about election or simply enthusiastic about
imposing death sentences, by 1992 Florida trial judges had imposed
death sentences in 134 cases where the jury had recommended life but
only overridden 51 death sentence recommendations. 161 Only in the
past ten years, as the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that it will
overturn most of the life-to-death overrides, 169 has the former practice
diminished substantially.
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that the average Flor-
ida trial or appellate judge presiding over a capital case is swayed by
extrinsic, non-legal factors. But it is meant to suggest that replacing
judicial elections with a judicial appointment system would remove a
significant source of pressure on judicial independence. Given the in-
creasing amount of money spent on judicial campaigns, this proposed
reform would probably also save money.
The Role of the Jury
Every one of the thirty-five death penalty states except Florida pro-
hibits a death sentence unless the sentencing jury unanimously con-
cludes either that at least one specified aggravator is present or that a
death sentence is warranted, and twenty-seven of these states require
both findings. 170 In order to recommend a death sentence in Florida,
in contrast, only a mere majority of jurors (seven out of twelve) need
agree on a death sentence and not even a majority is needed with re-
spect to any particular aggravator.17 1 Apparently the rationale for this
arrangement is that the trial judge is the ultimate decision-maker with
respect to the death sentence; thus, jury unanimity is not required. 172
167 Richard C. Dieter, With Justice for Few: The Growing Crisis in Death Penalty Representa-
tion (1995), Death Penalty Information Center, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/
742.
168 See Michael Radelet & Michael Mello, Death to Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of
the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 195, 196, 210-11 (1992).
169 Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Consti-
tution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 924, 937-38 (1991) (finding that 93% of life-to-death
overrides up to 1991 were reversed by the Court).
170 See State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 548-49 (Fla. 2005) (discussing state statutes).
171 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (requirement of majority); FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (re-
quirement of twelve jurors); 15A Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 2327.50 ("Capital aggravat-
ing circumstances are not required .. .to be individually found by a unanimous jury
verdict.").
172 SeeFIA. STAT. § 921.141(3); 15A FlaJur. 2d Criminal Law § 2323 (Westlaw through
Feb. 2009).
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Totally aside from whether this procedure violates the U.S. Su-
preme Court's holding in Ring v. Arizona1 73 that the jury, not the judge,
must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact that supports a death
sentence (an argument the Florida Supreme Court has rejected 74),
Florida's decision-making framework undermines the reliability of the
jury's death sentence recommendations in four ways. First, it permits
such a recommendation when reasonable doubt is very likely to exist.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a nine to three verdict
is sufficient for conviction, 175 it has never sanctioned a seven to five
verdict, and probably would not do so given the uncertainty it repre-
sents. 176 Second, even unanimous death sentence recommendations in
Florida are suspect because they can occur despite the possibility that
no single aggravator garnered more than one vote (each juror voting
for the death sentence may have settled on a different aggravator).
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed considerable ambivalence
about verdicts that leave unclear whether the necessary number of ju-
rors has agreed that every element of the crime was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 77 Third, research based on interviews with jurors in
Florida capital cases indicates that, since only a majority need agree on
the recommendation, discussion and deliberation in these cases is
often minimal. 78
A final problem with a majority-vote rule, especially when com-
bined with the judicial override procedure that only Florida and two
other states have, 179 is that jurors are much less likely to take their role
173 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596-97, 609 (2002).
174 See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (upholding Florida stat-
ute despite Ring, but on narrow and heavily contested grounds).
175Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972).
176 See generally id See also icL at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justice Blackmun
provided the fifth and deciding vote in Johnson and stated that a 7-5 verdict "would
afford me great difficulty.").
177 See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 627, 643-45, 651-52 (1991) (plurality hold-
ing that, when jurors may have based their vote on different elements of the crime, the
elements must at least have a moral equivalence); Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S.
813, 816 (1999) (holding, in interpreting the continuing criminal enterprise statute,
that the jury must unanimously agree on the three crimes that provide the predicate for
conviction).
178 See, e.g., WilliamJ. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination
of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 931, 979 (2006).
179 See FA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (2008); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2009) ("The jury's recommendation shall not be binding upon the
Court.").
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seriously. As the study just mentioned stated: "IJiurors in hybrid states
are significantly more likely than others to deny responsibility for the
defendant's punishment, to misunderstand sentencing instructions,
and to rush to judgment, all signs of the jury's lack of conscientious-
ness in its role as sentencer."i s Thus, the authors conclude, jurors
make better decisions when they are made to understand that they are
the ultimate arbiters of the defendants' fate, a conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court has at least obliquely recognized.8 1 Florida's death
penalty process, which tells capital sentencingjurors that their decision
is only a recommendation and need only be agreed upon by a major-
ity,18 2 is uniquely designed to send precisely the opposite message. In
part influenced by these considerations, the Florida Supreme Court
has called on the Florida Legislature "to revisit Florida's death penalty
statute to require some unanimity in the jury's recommendation."183
A separate problem with Florida's capital jury system-one that
probably afflicts all death penalty states-is that laypeople have great
difficulty following capital sentencing instructions. In one study involv-
ing interviews of individuals who had recently served on capital juries
in Florida, over 49% of the participants did not understand that they
could consider any evidence in mitigation, 1 4 and 48.7% were under
the misimpression that they needed to find mitigating evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt.18 5 The same study also found that over 36%
of the jurors interviewed believed, incorrectly, that they were required to
sentence the defendant to death if they found the defendant's conduct
180 Bowers et al., supra note 178, at 1003-04.
181 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985) ("[T]he uncorrected sugges-
tion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others
presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the impor-
tance of its role.").
182 Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases, § 7.11 (2) (West, Wesdaw through
2007) ("Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the
judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an
advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant.").
183 State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 438, 549 (Fla. 2005).
184 See William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 68 (2003) (on file with
the Review).
185 See id. Although many of the interviews in the Bowers and Foglia study took place a
year after the relevant trial, most jurors claimed to remember their deliberations "very
well" or "fairly well," and studies in other states have consistently replicated these types
of results. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1086 tbl.2 (1995).
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to be "heinous, vile, or depraved",18 6 and 25.2 % believed that if they
found the defendant to be a future danger to society they were required
to recommend a death sentence, despite the fact that "dangerousness"
is not a legitimate aggravating circumstance under Florida law.18 7
Some of these misunderstandings may result from ambiguity in the in-
structions;188 others may be almost impossible to avoid.189
In light of the foregoing observations, the Florida Death Penalty
Assessment Team made the following three recommendations:
(1) The State of Florida should redraft its capital jury instructions with
the objective of preventing common juror misconceptions that have been
identified in the research literature[.] (2) The State of Florida should re-
quire that the jury's sentencing verdict in capital cases be unanimous
and, when the sentencing verdict is a death sentence, that the jury reach
unanimous agreement on at least one aggravating circumstance. (3) The
State of Florida should give the jury final decision-making authority in
capital sentencing proceedings, and thus should eliminate judicial over-
ride in cases where the jury recommends life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
90
As with most of the other recommendations made to this point, these
recommendations are virtually cost-free, and they can only improve the
fairness of the death penalty process.
186 Bowers & Foglia, supra note 184, at 72. Note that Bowers and Foglia use the term
"heinous, vile or depraved" instead of "heinous, atrocious or cruel," which is the way
Florida expresses this aggravator. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (h) (West 2009).
187 See Bowers & Foglia, supra note 184 at 72; FiA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (West 2009).
188 See Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 1008, 1017 (Fla. 1992) (there need not be any
instruction about each juror's authority to consider any mitigator). Further, while the
judge must give an instruction about the "catch-all" mitigator, he or she need not give
specific instructions on non-statutory mitigators. See Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415,
(Fla. 1990) (overruled on other grounds). The standard of proof with respect to mitiga-
tors is described as follows: "If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circum-
stance exists, you may consider it as established." Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in
Crim. Cases, § 7.11(8) (b) (Westlaw though 2007) . Finally, as Professor Caldwell notes,
"[t] he sentencing decision is not to be made simply on the basis of toting up the aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances and seeing which list is longer. Yet the standard
jury] instructions do not forbid such a practice in the jury room." Gary Caldwell, Capi-
tal Crime Decisions: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NovA L. REv. 31, 37 (1992).
189 See, e.g., David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to jus-
tice, 59 JUDIcATuPE 478, 480-82 (1976) (in comparing an experimental group that re-
ceived Florida instructions on burglary to a control group that received no instructions,
the experimental jurors failed to show that they understood the law sufficiently). But see
Firoz Dattu, Illustrated Jury Instructions: A Proposal, 22 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 67, 70-71
n.15, 71 (1998) (criticizing methodology of the Strawn and Buchanan study).
190 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at 308.
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Clemency
Every state grants some entity within the executive branch the au-
thority to pardon crimes and commute sentences, including death
sentences; in Florida, this role is assigned to the governor and a Board
of Executive Clemency, consisting of the three members of the Cabi-
net, two of whom must agree with any gubernatorial decision to par-
don.191 In death penalty cases, the clemency process has traditionally
been viewed as a final safeguard, designed to evaluate the fairness of
the penalty in light of the circumstances of the case.192 And, as the
ABA has noted, "[t]he clemency process can only fulfill this critical
function when the exercise of the clemency power is governed by fun-
damental principles ofjustice, fairness, and mercy, and not by political
considerations. 1 93
Unfortunately, in Florida, politics probably have affected the exer-
cise of the clemency power. Since the re-establishment of the death
penalty in the 1970s, only six inmates on Florida's death row have re-
ceived executive clemency, three because of doubts about their guilt,
and three based on other considerations. 194 In raw numbers, this fig-
ure is average (Ohio has had eleven grants of clemency in death cases
since 1976, Virginia and New Jersey eight, and Georgia seven, but fif-
teen states have had fewer than six 195). But the more important point
for present purposes is that the last time a death sentence was com-
muted in Florida on humanitarian grounds was in 1983.196
That year is important as a political matter. As Bright and Keenan
have noted, it was around that period that the death penalty became "a
191 See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; FLA. STAT. § 940.01 (1) (West 2009); Fla. Rules of Execu-
tive Clemency, Rule 4 (2007) available at https://fpc.state.fl.us/Policies/Executive
ClemencyInfo.htm [hereinafter F.R.E.C.].
192 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at 244.
193 Id. at 244.
194 See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capi-
tal Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289, 300 (1993). Note that, pre-Furman, 23% of death
sentences were commuted. Margaret Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 315, 321-22 (1993) (catalogu-
ing Florida's clemency record).
195 See Clemency, Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
clemency (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Illinois has had 172 death sentence commutations,
in large part because of Governor George Ryan's decision that the death penalty pro-
cess in that state was seriously flawed. See id.; Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment,
Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/511 (last
visited Apr. 17, 2009).
196 See Clemency, supra note 195.
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dominant political issue in Florida[. 1"97 Since that time Florida gover-
nors have often made the signing of death warrants a part of their
campaign strategy. 198 One gubernatorial candidate even ran advertise-
ments boasting about the ninety death warrants he signed in his four
years of office, and an observer of another Florida gubernatorial cam-
paign stated that "'nothing [sells] on the campaign trail like promises
to speed up the death penalty."' 199 Nationwide research indicates that
states are 25% more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial elec-
tion years than in other years, that the total number of executions per-
formed is higher in election years, and that the relationship between
elections and executions is strongest in the South. 200
Any potential for extrinsic factors to affect clemency decision-mak-
ing is exacerbated by the absence in Florida law of clear criteria or
procedures for making the clemency determination and the lack of
transparency in the process. While the Parole Commission "may con-
duct a thorough and detailed investigation" of every death row in-
mate, 20 1 Florida law does not require the Board of Executive Clemency
to consider these findings, does not specify the factors the Commission
or the Board is to investigate or consider, does not require the Board
to attend interviews with the inmate or his or her representative, leaves
the decision as to whether to hold a public hearing to the Board
(which in recent years has seldom requested one 2 2), and does not re-
quire the Board to explain its decision.203 All information gathered is
to be kept confidential and Board meetings are not transcribed, 20 4 so
the process usually remains hidden from the public.
The Assessment Team made the following recommendation re-
garding the clemency process in Florida:
The State of Florida's Board of Executive Clemency should: (a) adopt a
rule that calls for the Board of Executive Clemency (Board) to issue a
brief written statement in every instance wherein a death-sentenced in-
197 Bright & Keenan, supra note 165, at 772.
198 See id.
199 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
200 See Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics and the
Timing of Executions, 46J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2003).
201 F.R.E.C., supra note 191, Rule 15(B).
202 See Interview with Stephen Hebert, Director of the Clemency Administrative Office
(Jan. 2005) (on file with author). See also F.R.E.C., supra note 191, Rules 15(E) & (F).
203 See F.R.E.C., supra note 191, Rule 15. See generally Joseph B. Schimmel, Commutation
of the Death Sentence: florida Steps Back from Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 253
(1992).
204 See F.R.E.C., supra note 191, Rule 16.
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mate is denied clemency, making specific reference to the various fac-
tors/claims that the Board may have considered; (b) adopt a rule
delineating the factors that the Board should consider, but not be limited
to, when reviewing a death-sentenced inmate's grounds for clemency; (c)
adopt a rule establishing that a death-sentenced inmate will receive a
public hearing before the Board prior to the clemency determination;
and (d) adopt a rule that calls for the Governor to, at a minimum, assign
a clemency aide to routinely attend, in person or via video-conference,
the Parole Commission interviews with the death-sentenced inmate since
the Governor is, in effect, the principal clemency decision-maker and
could therefore be well-served by an aide's first-hand observations. We
also recommend that such a rule should attempt to facilitate participa-
tion by the clemency aides of the other members of the Board, at the
discretion of their respective principals. 20 5
Race
Concern about racial discrimination permeates debates about the
death penalty. One of the rationales for the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Furman v. Georgia2 6-which concluded that the death penalty
as administered in 1972 constituted cruel and unusual punishment-
was its discriminatory impact on black defendants. 20 7 In the post-
Furman era, with the elimination of obvious sentencing disparities be-
tween white and black defendants, the focus of the debate has shifted
to the race of the victim; a significant body of research indicates that,
even under modern statutes, people who kill whites are much more
likely to be sentenced to death than people who kill blacks. 208 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
death penalty based on these types of data,20 9 its principal rationale for
doing so-that imperfections in the criminal justice system cannot be
avoided 21 0-hardly allays concerns that some people are sentenced to
205 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi.
206 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
207 See id. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing research showing that black
defendants were more likely to receive the death penalty than their white co-defendants
and that blacks were more likely to receive the death sentence for charges of rape). See
also, id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 355-56 (Marshall, J. concurring).
208 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1711-15 (1998) (distinguishing midrange death penalty cases
from those that had numerous or few aggravating circumstances, Baldus and his col-
league concluded, after studying over 2000 cases in Georgia in the 1970s, that 14.4% of
the black-victim midrange cases received the death penalty while 34.4% of the white-
victim cases received the death penalty).
209 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
210 See id. at 312-13 (admitting that the data indicate a discrepancy in death sentences
"that appears to correlate with race[ ]" but stating that "[a] pparent disparities in sen-
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death on invidious racial grounds rather than through application of
appropriate legal criteria.
Numerous studies of the Florida capital punishment process,
spanning the past thirty-five years, have confirmed a correlation be-
tween the imposition of a death sentence and the race of the murder
victim. 211 After summarizing the relevant research, Baldus and his col-
leagues concluded that "[i] n states with strong evidence of race-of-vic-
tim discrimination, such as Florida.... we estimate that one quarter to
one-third of death-sentenced defendants with white victims would have
avoided the death penalty if their victims had been black."212 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court itself has recognized the problem.213 In 1990, a
Commission it sponsored issued a report that concluded, among other
things, that "lt]he application of the death penalty in Florida is not
colorblind, inasmuch as a criminal defendant in a capital case is, other
things being equal, 3.4 times more likely to receive the death penalty if
tencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system [ ]" and noting that "any
mode for determining guilt or punishment 'has its weaknesses and the potential for
misuse."' (citation omitted)).
211 See William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and Killing Them: An
Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IowA L. REv. 1505, 1535-36,
1542-43 (2002) (also finding race-of-defendant bias in Florida); Levenson & Salamone,
supra note 106 (describing a study of 283 first-degree murder cases prosecuted from
Jan. 1, 1986, through Sept. 30, 1991 in Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Brevard, Lake, and
Volusia counties that found that prosecutors sought the death penalty 27% of the time
when white victims were involved and only 14% of the time when minority victims were
involved); Linda Foley, Florida after the Furman Decision: The Effect of Extralegal Factors on
the Processing of Capital Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 457 (1987); David C. Baldus et
al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to
State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133 (1986); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro,
Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimi-
zation, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 108 (1984) (finding a stable and consistent pattern of racial
discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia, largely based on race of
victim); Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46
Am. Soc. REv. 918 (1981) (finding, among 637 homicide indictments in twenty Florida
counties during 1976 and 1977, that those who killed whites were substantially more
likely to receive a death sentence after controlling for several nonracial factors that
might be thought to explain the racial differences); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Admin-
istration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. Riv. 456 (1981); WilliamJ.
Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 599 tbl.3 (1980) (white victim bias).
212 Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 160, at 1445 n.123.
213 See Fla. Sup. Ct. Racial & Ethnic Bias Study Comm'n, "Where the Injured Fly for Jus-
tice": Reforming Practices Which Impede the Dispensation ofJustice to Minorities in florida (Dec.
11, 1990), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/pubs/bin/racial.pdf.
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the victim is White than if the victim is an African-American." 214 This
assertion was based in large part on a study conducted by Michael
Radelet and Glenn Pierce that found that forty-nine of fifty-seven ex-
ecutions through 1990 involved defendants who had killed white vic-
tims (thirty-six white on white, twelve black on white, one Native
American on white) and that none of the remaining eight executions
involved whites who had killed blacks. 215
This evidence of racial disparity, which appears to be overwhelm-
ing, has nonetheless been disputed. In 2000, the Capital Cases Task
Force, created by Governor Jeb Bush to study racial factors in capital
cases, concluded that previous studies were outdated and may have re-
lied on flawed methodology. 216 The Task Force conceded that no white
person had ever been executed in Florida for the murder of a black
person and that, of 368 inmates on Florida's death row at the end of
1999, only five whites awaited execution for killing a black.217 Yet Regi-
nald Brown, the governor's deputy general counsel and a member of
the Task Force, stated that "[w] hat we found is that the studies so far
have been too simplistic and didn't have enough controls[.]"2 1 8 This
statement is correct in the limited sense that most of the studies fo-
cused on Florida did not include as many variables in their regression
analysis as studies in other states have.219 Nonetheless, all of the evi-
dence that does exist points in one direction, and the Governor's Task
Force did not offer any alternative explanations for the results. 220
214 Id. at 15.
215 See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the
Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FA. L. REv. 1 (1991). See also Radelet & Pierce, supra note
106, at 612 (finding that among Florida homicide cases from a sample of twenty-one
counties, prosecutors were most likely to pursue the death penalty in cases in which the
victim was white).
216 See Jo Becker, Task Force: Death Penalty Bias Unclear, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 8,
2000, at 4B.
217 See id.
218 Id.
219 See Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 160. But see Lofquist, supra note 211, at 1535-
36 (looking at dozens of variables and settling on twenty-nine that had a significant
relationship to "death penalty intensity").
220 See Becker, supra note 141. One unexamined variable that might explain some of
the race-of-victim differences found by researchers, suggested by prosecutors, is that
"black witnesses often are more reluctant to cooperate with authorities." Baldus &
Woodworth, supra note 160, at 1449 n.146 (quoting Levenson & Salamone, supra note
106). Presumably, however, unavailability of witnesses would most likely make convic-
tions, not death sentences, harder to obtain.
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The Capital Cases Task Force did recommend that defense law-
yers be permitted to question jurors privately about racial bias, that
judges advise jurors that race, gender and ethnicity may not influence
their deliberations, that the Legislature finance further study of racial
bias in the capital punishment system, and that the Legislature also
establish an information clearinghouse about race issues in the crimi-
nal process at Florida A & M University.221 As of 2008, none of these
recommendations had been followed. Accordingly, the Assessment
Team once again recommended that "[t]he State of Florida should
sponsor a study to determine the existence or non-existence of unac-
ceptable disparities, whether they be racial, socio-economic, geo-
graphic, or otherwise in its death penalty system, or, at least,
implement the recommendations of its 2000 Governor's Task Force on
Capital Cases."222 If racial disparities are confirmed by such research,
more serious consideration should be given to the Task Force's other
recommendations, as well as initiation of a prosecutorial training pro-
gram about racial issues. Furthermore, some entity (perhaps the inno-
cence commission proposed later in this article) should undertake a
close re-evaluation of death penalty cases in which the victim was
white. 223
Mental Disability
In recent years the U.S. Supreme Court has decided two impor-
tant cases addressing the relevance of mental disability in death pen-
alty cases. In Atkins v. Virginia,224 it held that execution of people with
mental retardation is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. And in Panetti v. Quarterman,225 it rejected a shallow in-
terpretation of the rule prohibiting execution of people whose mental
disability renders them incapable of understanding the death penalty
and the reason it is being imposed on them; as the Panetti majority
stressed, the offender's understanding of why the penalty is being im-
221 See Becker, supra note 141.
222 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi.
223 A number of Florida cases have claimed the death sentence should be reversed
because a disproportionate number of defendants who kill whites are subject to capital
prosecutions. These claims have always been dismissed. See, e.g., Bundy v. Dugger, 850
F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir. 1988); Funchess v. Wainwright, 788 F.2d 1443, 1445-46 (llth
Cir. 1986); Washington v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 922, 923 (11th Cir. 1984); Adams v.
Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1449-50 (lth Cir. 1983), vacated on other grds, 466 U.S. 964
(1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 612-16 (5th Cir. 1978).
224 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
225 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
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posed must be "rational" and not undermined by delusional think-
ing.226 Lower courts have struggled with related issues, including the
proper procedures to follow when a death row inmate who has mental
disability wants to waive post-conviction appeals or is no longer able to
assist his or her attorney with them. 22
7
As in the other settings discussed in this article, Florida law in this
area is subject to criticism in several respects. Of course Florida follows
Atkins, and thus bans execution of people with mental retardation. 22
But its definition of mental retardation is narrow. 229 Furthermore, the
state does not prohibit execution of people who were seriously men-
tally ill at the time of their offense, despite the fact that such people
are generally more impaired and less able to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of their actions than people with mental retardation 20 (and cer-
tainly less so than juveniles, who are also exempt from death sentences
after Roper v. Simmons 31).
Florida law is also unclear about three key issues that arise when
mental disability manifests itself after conviction and sentence. First,
Florida law provides that, when courts are determining the compe-
tency of a death row inmate who decides to waive a post-conviction
claim, their focus should be on whether the inmate "understands the
consequences" of the waiver, 2 2 thus leaving unsettled the validity of a
waiver by a depressed inmate who can understand these consequences
but does not care about them (and yet may feel very differently after
the depression is treated).233 Second, Florida law does not resolve
whether the post-conviction process may proceed when a death row
226 See id. at 27 ("A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not
the same as a rational understanding of it.").
227 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1169, 1177-92 (2005) (describing the
issues and relevant court cases).
228 See FiA. STAT. § 921.137(2) (West 2009).
229 See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (West 2009). Compare Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319,
329 (Fla. 2007) (holding that an IQ above 70 does not meet the subaverage intellectual
functioning part of Florida's test) with Am. Ass'n on Intellectual & Developmental Disa-
bilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability, available at http://www.aamr.org/content_
100.cfm?navlD=21 ("Generally, an IQ test score of around 70 or as high as 75 indicates
a limitation in intellectual functioning.").
230 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 73-75 (Harvard University Press) (2006).
231 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
232 Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1993).
233 See generally John Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005).
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inmate decompensates and can no longer assist the attorney in that
process. 2 4 Third, while Florida's definition of competency to be exe-
cuted is arguably consistent with Panetti,235 Florida law does not address
whether inmates who are found incompetent under this standard may
be forcibly medicated to make them competent or instead should have
their sentence commuted.
In August 2006, the American Bar Association's House of Dele-
gates unanimously passed a resolution, also joined by the American
Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association,
that addressed all of these issues. 23 6 The Assessment Team endorsed
that Resolution and restated several of its tenets as a multi-pronged
recommendation:
[T] he State of Florida should adopt a law or rule: (a) forbidding death
sentences and executions with regard to everyone who, at the time of the
offense, had significantly subaverage limitations in both their general in-
tellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual,
social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental retardation, de-
mentia, or a traumatic brain injury; (b) forbidding death sentences and
executions with regard to everyone who, at the time of the offense, had a
severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their ca-
pacity (i) to appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their
conduct, (ii) to exercise rational judgment in relation to their conduct,
or (iii) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law; and (c)
providing that a death-row inmate is not 'competent' for execution where
the inmate, due to a mental disorder or disability, has significantly im-
paired capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punish-
ment, or to appreciate the reason for its imposition in the inmate's own
case. It should further provide that when a finding of incompetence is
made after challenges to the validity of the conviction and death sentence
have been exhausted and execution has been scheduled, the death sen-
tence will be reduced to life without the possibility of parole (or to a life
sentence for those sentenced prior to the adoption of life without the
234 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a) (stating that a defendant must be competent during
"any material stage of a criminal proceeding" including pretrial, trial and sentence-
related proceedings but does not describe the consequences of a non-restorability find-
ing in the post-conviction context). See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.213(b) (Lexis, LexisNexis
through Sept. 1, 2007) (providing for release or civil commitment within five years if a
defendant is not restorable to competency).
235 See RA. STAT. § 922.07(2) (a person under sentence of death is insane for purposes
of execution if the person lacks "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the
death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him or her"). See also
Provezano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597, 602 (Fla. 1999) (a lower court opinion requiring
rational comprehension and interpreting the language of Fla. Stat.§ 922.07 consistently
with Panetti).
236 See Am. BAR ASS'N REs. 122A (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/me-
dia/docs/122A.pdf [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION].
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possibility of parole as the sole alternative punishment to the death
penalty) .237
Sections (a) and (b) of this recommendation call for expanding
the death penalty prohibition to all of those with significant subaver-
age intellectual functioning at the time of the offense (including those
whose impairment is due to something other than retardation) and to
those who were insane at the time of the crime under the broadest
formulation of the insanity defense (a rule that would have substantial
impact at the sentencing phase in Florida, which has a very narrow
insanity test238). Section (c) deals with the third post-conviction issue
described above, by more clearly adopting Panetti's test and by requir-
ing commutation of the death sentence whenever a person for whom a
death warrant has been issued is found incompetent to be executed, a
rule that would bar forcible medication designed to enable
execution. 23 9
The Assessment Team's report makes positive reference to (but
did not officially endorse) two other provisions of the ABA/APA/APA
Resolution, which deal with the other two post-conviction issues noted
earlier. 240 The first of these provisions deals with the "depressed in-
mate" scenario described above by providing the following:
If a court finds that a prisoner under sentence of death who wishes to
forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings has a mental disorder or
disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity to make a rational
decision, the court should permit a next friend acting on the prisoner's
behalf to initiate or pursue available remedies to set aside the conviction
or death sentence. 241
The second recommendation provides that post-conviction proceed-
ings that require the participation of the death row inmate should be
suspended if the inmate is significantly impaired in the ability to assist
counsel, and that the death sentence should be commuted to life if
"there is no significant likelihood of restoring the prisoner's capac-
ity [.]"242 The latter rule is arguably required by analogy to Jackson v.
2 37 FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi-xii.
238 See Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases § 3.6(A) (insanity is established
when the defendant had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect, and because of this con-
dition, he or she did not know what he or she was doing or its consequences, or, he or
she did not know that what he or she was doing was wrong).
239 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at xi-xii.
240 Id at 398.
241 ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 236 § 3(b).
242 Id. § 3(c).
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Indiana,241 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant who
cannot be restored to competency to stand trial cannot be tried, but
instead must either be released or civilly committed.
These various recommendations could have a noticeable impact
on the administration of the death penalty. One observer estimated
that "as many as fifty percent of Florida's death row inmates become
intermittently insane[.]" 244 Some of these individuals were probably
also seriously impaired at the time of the offense, presumably not sig-
nificantly enough to be found insane under Florida's relatively strict
insanity test but perhaps sufficiently so that they did not deserve the
death penalty. 245 These facts suggest that under a normatively prefera-
ble, and arguably constitutionally required, standard at least some of
the people on Florida's death row should never have been sentenced
to death and others should have had their sentences commuted to life
without parole.
CONCLUSION: INNOCENCE AND ECONOMICS
The description of Florida law and practice in this article raises
grave doubts about whether all of the people who are currently on
death row in Florida (not to mention the twenty-two who have been
released from it) deserve it. Problems associated with police investiga-
tive techniques, scientific testing procedures, prosecutorial decisions
during charging and trial, defense attorney qualifications and compen-
sation, judicial and jury decision-making, jury instructions, the clem-
ency process, and racial and disability bias can undermine the
reliability of convictions in capital cases, the death sentences handed
down in such cases, or both. The Florida Assessment Team believed
that all of these matters deserve very serious consideration by
policymakers.
The Assessment Team was particularly concerned about the possi-
bility that people who do not commit capital murder will nonetheless
24 3Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
244 Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FL. ST.
U. L. REv. 35, 42 (1986).
245 See, e.g., Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1081, 1088-90 (Fla. 2008). Another concern in
such cases is that, without a prohibition on execution of those who were seriously men-
tally ill at the time of the offense, the jury will improperly consider mental disability an
aggravating circumstance, relying on the incorrect assumption that such people are ab-
normally dangerous. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 230, at 87-92 (for a detailed discussion of
this point).
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be convicted. Thus, as a final pair of recommendations, the Team
concluded:
The State of Florida should create two independent commissions to: (a)
establish the cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases and recom-
mend changes to prevent future wrongful convictions in these cases; and
(b) review claims of factual innocence in capital cases that, if sustained,
would then be reviewed by a panel of judges.246
The creation of the first type of commission is important because un-
derstanding the reasons for mistakes in the death penalty process-
which have been numerous in Florida, as the long list of exonerees
suggests-can help improve it.2 4 7 The second type of commission,
which would supplement the current largely ineffectual post-convic-
tion process,24 has long existed in some European countries, 249 was re-
cently established in North Carolina, and is being considered in at
least twelve other states,250 in large part because of the perception that
procedural defaults and inadequate lawyering sometimes prevent
claims of factual innocence from receiving full consideration.
Throughout, this article has also devoted attention to the cost of
the recommendations made. Aside from the innocence commission
proposals, the recommendation that racial disparities be studied, and
the suggested increases in defense compensation, none of the recom-
mendations made here would require the State of Florida to incur sig-
nificant expense, and even the innocence and race projects would
have only minimal fiscal impact. Further, because all of the proposed
reforms should improve the reliability of the process, death sentences
and the associated costs would be reduced. Only a few of these re-
forms have been considered since the Assessment Team's report was
246 Id. at ix-x.
247 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 127 (2008)
("While innocence commissions remain a new and largely untested institutional ap-
proach, an investment in such specialist institutions remains entirely justified where
generalist appellate and post conviction courts face such difficulties in assessing
innocence.").
248 See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 14, at ix-x. See alsoJoseph L. Hoffman & NancyJ.
King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 791 (2009)
(arguing, based on a study of federal habeas corpus cases, that the federal post-convic-
tion process "offers no realistic hope of relief for those who reach federal court").
249 See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REv. 383, 437 (2007)
(describing development of innocence commission in the United Kingdom).
250 See PatrikJonsson &Jesse DeConto, North Carolina Creates a New Route to Exoneration,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 10, 2006, at 1-2.
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issued in September 2006, suggesting some resistance to them. 251 But
that resistance is probably due less to their perceived cost than to a
conviction that the system is good enough as it is, or the belief that,
even if reform is needed, it will be politically unpopular precisely be-
cause fewer death sentences would result. 252
Merely stating these latter reasons for truncating reform suggests
how unsatisfactory they are. But for policymakers who remain con-
cerned about the political fallout of endorsing change in the death
penalty process, one further economic consideration is offered: the
current system is simply too expensive. It is estimated that although
capital cases comprise only 3% of all criminal felony filings, they oc-
cupy 50% of the Florida Supreme Court's docket.25 And the cost of a
capital case resulting in a death sentence far exceeds the costs associ-
ated with a case in which a sentence short of death is sought. 254 As a
result, all members of the Assessment Team, including those repre-
senting the state, were deeply worried that the expenditure of re-
251 Ron Word, Death Penalty Reforms Ignored, THE LEDGER, Oct. 24, 2008, at B5, available
at http://www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081024/NEWS/8102403
59/1374&Title=DeathPenaltyReportIgnored.
252 Evidence for the belief that many believe the system works sufficiently well comes
from the Florida Commission on Capital Cases which, in implying that the Florida
death penalty system is not in trouble, noted that none of the twenty-three exonerees it
examined were found "innocent" (not surprisingly, since such a verdict does not exist),
and that "[t] he guilt of only four defendants ... was subsequently doubted by the
prosecuting office or the Governor and Cabinet members." See FL.COMM'N ON CAPITAL
CASES, supra note 7, at 5. (The Commission glossed over the fact that, of the remaining
twenty, eight had their charges dismissed, ten were acquitted on retrial, and two
pleaded guilty to lesser charges, presumably with the consent of the prosecution). Evi-
dence of the second reason for resistance comes from the experience of the Assessment
Team itself. At least four members of the original eleven-member Assessment Team
were clearly worried about the political repercussions of a recommendation for a mora-
torium on the death penalty, and three of these individuals ended up removing them-
selves from the Team, although at least one of these agreed with all of our
recommendations; such actions are understandable but unfortunate.
253 Frank Davies, Death Penalty System Called Highly Flawed: Two-Thirds of US Cases Over-
turned, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 2000, at IA.
254 See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty
in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 719 (1990-1991) (noting that
in Florida a death sentence case costs approximately $2.5 million more than a life sen-
tence of forty years); D. Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-sixth as Expensive,
MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 1988, at 12A (citing 1988 study showing $3.2 million in extra
costs associated with death penalty in Florida). Cf. Richard C. Dieter, A Crisis of Confi-
dence: Americans'Doubts About the Death Penalty, at 10, (2007), Death Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/CoC%20dpic%202007% 20poll.pdf
(noting that California is spending roughly $250 million per execution).
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sources on capital cases significantly detracts from Florida's ability to
renderjustice in non-capital cases. 255 Perhaps the ultimate rationale for
correcting as many deficiencies as possible in the death penalty process
(and thus reducing the number of capital charges and death
sentences) is that the quality of the entire criminal justice system would
be improved.
The fact that the death penalty system in Florida manages to soak
up a huge proportion of judicial and financial resources yet remains
seriously flawed suggests an alternative reform: abolition of the death
penalty, or at least a moratorium on its administration while improve-
ments are made. The American Bar Association has adopted the latter
position. 256 The Florida Assessment Team could not reach a consensus
on the issue, and therefore did not put forward that recommendation.
But, as this article has demonstrated, there are numerous reasons for
keeping both of the latter options on the table.
255 Cf Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at Al (describing movement in public defender offices in seven states, including
Florida, to refuse to represent defendants charged with misdemeanors and lesser felo-
nies because of case overload).
256 See Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, Am. Bar Ass'n, http://www.
abanet.org/moratorium/why.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 1 Elon L. Rev. 63 2009
HeinOnline  -- 1 Elon L. Rev. 64 2009
